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The Public Trust in Private Hands: Social Security
and the Politics of Government Investment
Benjamin A. Templin'
INTRODUCTION
T HE funding crisis facing Social Security' could be dramatically
reduced if the money accumulating in the Trust Fund were invested
in a diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds and other assets3 rather than in
I Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (email: btemplin@tjsl.edu).
B.A. 1981, Grinnell College; J.D. 1998, University of California, Berkeley Boalt Hall School
of Law. For their valuable assistance, the author wishes to thank Howell Jackson, Kathryn
Moore, Ellen Waldman, Julie Greenberg, Kenneth Vandevelde, Deven Desai, Anders Kaye,
Linda Keller, Kaimipono Wenger, Richard Winchester, June MacLeod, Patrick Meyer, Torin
Andrews, Karen Untiedt, Amanda Moceri, Matthew Simon, Kara Shacket and Dr. Phakphum
Srinuan. The opinions expressed here, as well as any errors or omissions, are entirely those of
the author.
2 The current form of funding Social Security is the Pay As You Go (PAYGO) model
where most of the monies collected from the FICA payroll tax immediately go out to pay
benefits to current retirees. What is not immediately paid out as benefits is invested in
government bonds in a Trust Fund. The Trust holds $1.9 trillion in government bonds, but it's
not nearly enough to fund the expected benefits of future retirees under one set of predictions
by the Social Security Administration. Actuaries and economists predict that payroll tax will
be insufficient to pay benefits by 2017 and that the Social Security Trust Fund reserves will
be exhausted by 2041. 11-E 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISAILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R.
Doc. No. i io-3o, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TRo7/tro7.pdf.
Some scholars challenge the predictions that a crisis exists in Social Security financing. See
Neil H. Buchanan, SocialSecurity and Government Deficits: When Should We Worry?, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 257, 288 (2007) (arguing that no radical change should be made to Social Security since
the demographic shifts resulting in fewer workers per retiree paying into the system will be
offset by increases in productivity). Even if the scholars asserting that a problem doesn't exist
are correct, policymakers should manage the Trust Fund in a way to maximize the wealth.
Benjamin A. Templin, Comment on Neil H. Buchanan's Social Security and Government Deficits:
When Should We Worry?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 291 (2007).
3 Over long periods of time, a fully diversified portfolio will not only outperform a
portfolio of only bonds, it will do so with less risk. Professor Jeremy Siegel analyzed 200 years
of market data and discovered that over 17 year periods, stocks have never had a negative
return whereas bonds have been at risk of inflation outpacing the interest rate and therefore
actually losing money in some time periods studied. Stocks generally outperform bonds as
well. During 30 year periods, stocks outperform bonds over 99% of the time. JEREMY J. SIEGEL,
STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 26-28 (3d ed. 2002). Estimates vary on the effect that investment
will have on delaying the funding crisis. The estimates often depend on the percentage that
the Trust Fund invests in stocks as well as other structural changes made to the system in terms
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government bonds. 4 While the long-term economic benefits of a diversified
portfolio are undisputed,' the politics of government investment in the
private markets has been debated nearly as long as Social Security has
been in existence. 6 Republicans and Libertarians are concerned that the
government will engage in politically motivated investing,7 interfere
in corporate governance' and that an inherent conflict of interest exists
of raising taxes and reducing benefits. A conservative GAO report suggests that investment
will delay the crisis only eleven years. Lewis D. Solomon & Bryan L. Berson, Private Market
Reforms for Social Security: A Comprehensive Guide for Composing Reform Legislation, I I S. CAL.
INTERDIsC. L.J. 117, 136 (2001). Whereas, Bosworth and Burtless calculated that the funding
crisis could be averted for as long as 53 years if 70 percent of the assets of the Trust Fund were
invested and an immediate tax rate hike of 2% occurred. Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless,
The Effects of Social Security Reform on Saving, Investment, and the Level and Distribution of Worker
Well-Being, Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-02, at 6 (2000).
4 The investment of the Trust Fund in government bonds is controversial. Some
commentators maintain that the bonds are merely IOUs which will require further taxation or
an increase in the deficit by issuing more debt to pay off the amount owed to the Trust Fund.
ALLEN W. SMITH, fIE LOOTING OF SOCIAL SECURITY: How THE GOVERNMENT is DRAINING
AMERICA'S RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 43-44 (2004).
5 The economic questions are not controversial. To improve funding, the central trust
should diversify assets into a broader portfolio. The controversy arises in "the ability of Social
Security to invest well and to avoid improper interference in corporate governance." Peter A.
Diamond, The Economics of SocialSecurity Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 38,
39-40 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
6 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 123.
7 The 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security contended that politicians would
assert political pressure on the managers of the Social Security Trust Fund to forgo investments
based on the potential return and make decisions based on criteria that would "achieve other
economic, social, or political purposes." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY
FINANCING: IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE
FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY 3 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/
a398074.pdf. President Bush's Commission on Social Security emphasized in a 2001 report
that "Government must not invest Social Security funds in the stock market." See PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN Soc. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL
WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 13 (2001), available at http://www.csss.gov/reports/Final_report.
pdf (emphasis added). For a more detailed discussion of social investments, see infra notes
364-42o and accompanying text.
8 Examples of shareholder activism include filing proxy statements seeking to direct
management to engage in certain activities or bringing derivative lawsuits alleging a breach of
a fiduciary duty. State legislators have sought to influence public pension plans so as to vote
stock in order to prevent a corporate takeover if the merger would result in a loss of jobs to
the region. Roberta Romano, Public Pension FundActivism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 814-15 (1993). The sheer size of the Trust Fund at its current size of
$1.9 trillion will make the government one of the largest investors in the world. Estimates vary
but it could hold anywhere from 2% to 27.5% of all U.S. equities. Kent A. Smetters, Thinking
About Social Security's TrustFund, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 201, 207 (Olivia
S. Mitchell, Robert J. Myers & Howard Young eds., 1999). The government could significantly
impact corporate decision even if it held as little as z% of the outstanding equity of a company.
Michael Tanner, The Perils of Government Investing, CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 43, at 3
(Dec. 1, 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/pubslbriefs/bP-o43es.html. Although studies
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when the government owns an interest in private enterprise.9 Most
commentators have considered only two solutions to the problem of
government investment-private accounts 0 and passive investing." Both
solutions address the fundamental problems of government involvement
show social investing can result in lower than market return, shareholder activism doesn't
necessarily result in negative returns. Romano, supra note 8, at 829. In fact, commentators
contend that activist shareholders will increase corporate profits since shareholders will limit
management's misuse of corporate assets. Michael P. Smith, ShareholderActivism by Institutional
Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 1, 227-52 (1996). Whether shareholder activism
results in better returns or not, critics of government investing are still philosophically opposed
to government investments in private enterprise since it runs counter to the ideological
foundation of a capitalist system. Krzysztof M. Ostaszewski, Privatizing the SocialSecurity Trust
Fund? Don't Let the Government Invest, CATO INST., Jan. 14, 1997, http://www.cato.org/pubs/
ssps/ssp6es.html. Investment by the government of Trust Fund assets has been suggested to
be a form of socialism. SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN,'ThE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY
AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 69-70 (1999).
9 Since the government regulates commerce, a conflict of interest arises when the
regulator becomes a shareholder. SCHIEBER & SHOVEN, supra note 8, at 348. The decisions
by governmental regulatory bodies often have an effect on share price, consequently the
government will be conflicted if its objective decisions will affect the performance of the
fund. Conflicts exist across many public agencies including regulatory bodies such as the Food
and Drug Administration (approval of drugs often results in an uptick in a company's stock),
in antitrust investigations (company stock often dips when antitrust charges are brought), in
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight, and in the Federal Reserve's decisions
on interest rates (lowering the Fed rate usually results in a bull market). Theodore J. Angelis,
Investing Public Money in Private Markets: What Are the Right Questions?, in FRAmING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DEBATE 287, 312-14 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
io Private accounts (also referred to as personal accounts or defined contribution plans)
were an important agenda item for President Bush's administration. Under the proposal a
portion of the FICA payroll tax would go into an account owned by the taxpayer, who would
then choose from a selection of different investment options. President Bush argued that
private investment would yield a high rate of return in order to offset the reductions in Social
Security benefits projected under the PAYGO system. Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 117,
121. Privatization would have changed the nature of Social Security by creating a traditional
right of ownership in one's account, including the right of one's heirs to inherit the balance
remaining after death. Id. For private accounts, "decisional power [is] diffused across numerous
plan beneficiaries, [so] the likelihood that political pressure will push substantial pension fund
assets into high-risk, low-return projects decreases." Romano, supra note 8, at 844.
I I Passive investing, also known as indexing, is an investment strategy where funds are
automatically invested in a broad based stock market index such as those represented by
the Russell or Wilshire indexes. Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 137. Passive investing
reduces the pressure on "public pension fund managers to engage in social investing or non-
value-maximizing share voting." Romano, supra note 8, at 842. The Federal Thrift Savings
Fund (TSP) for federal employees has a passive investment strategy in order to eliminate
political pressure on the investment decision. Deborah M. Weiss, The Regulation of Funded
SocialSecurity, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 993, 997 (1998). Moreover, event studies show that passive
investing yields the same or greater returns than most mutual funds; consequently, a passive
strategy may actually lead to better returns than an actively managed fund. Romano, supra
note 8, at 842-43.
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in private investment, but neither is politically viable."2 President Bush's
private accounts proposal ran into opposition from commentators who
claimed, among other things, that it favored rich taxpayers and exposed the
needy to unnecessary risks of market downturns; 13 whereas conservatives
are adamantly opposed to any solution where the government makes the
investment decision.14
A third solution which has not received as much attention is the notion of
creating a private federal government corporation (FGC) formed to invest
the Trust Fund in a broadly diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds and other
assets.'5 Such a model is used effectively by the state of Alaska to invest
I 2 Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool
of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 987 (2007); see also Jackie
Calmes, Will Bush Bargain to Save Social Security?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, zoo6, at A6.
13 Private accounts came under criticism for numerous reasons. Charges were made that
benefits would be cut for the elderly poor-the group less able to withstand cuts in benefits.
See Kathryn L. Moore, President Bush ' Personal Retirement Accounts: Saving or Dismantling Social
Security, in 2oo5 N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMP. § 5-1, 5-24 tO 5-25. It has
been contended that certain groups, principally women and African Americans, would fare
poorly under the system. Greg Anrig, Jr. & Bernard Wasow, Twelve Reasons Why Privatizing
Social Security is a Bad Idea, THE SOCIAL SECURITY NETWORK, Dec. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.socsec.org/publications.asp?pubid=503. Also, the promise of higher returns was
cast in doubt given the anticipated management fees charged by brokerage houses and the
costs incurred in setting up the system. Id. Based on recent history of the effectiveness of
40(k) plans, workers also will likely "have difficulty making prudent decisions concerning
investment and withdrawal of funds in their individual accounts." Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reform: Lessons From Private Pensions, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 297,
320-21 (2007). Moreover, private account proposals will change the historic balance that Social
Security maintains between equity and adequacy. Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under
a Partially Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 988-89 (1998). Although
reasonable people could disagree on these issues, the fact remains that private accounts ran
up against opposition from both Democrats and Republicans. The option remains politically
unviable given strong Democratic opposition. Befort, supra note 12, at 963-64; see also, e.g.,
DEMOCRATIC NAT'L CONVENTION COMM., STRONG AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE WORLD: THE
2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR AMERICA 26 (2oo4), http://www.democrats.org/
pdfS/2oo4platform.pdf.
14 The indexing strategy for Social Security investing has been criticized because: (I)
investing $1.9 trillion into an index will increase the share price for some companies beyond
the real value, SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 352, (2) passive investment typically prevents the voting
of shares on corporate governance issues and the Trust Fund should actively participate in
corporate governance in order to limit waste by managers, Weiss, supra note II, at 997-98, and
(3) an actively managed portfolio that is fully diversified can yield better returns than a passive
approach with proper management since indexes don't exist for many high yield investment
such as private equity funds, Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The Future of SocialSecurity,
22 J.L. & POL. 395, 448 (2007).
15 Proposals which provide for investment by the central trust fund are generally
referred to as "full funding" or pre-funding of the Social Security Trust Fund. Full funding
proposals generally combine raising taxes, benefit cuts, and prudent, diversified investment
by a centralized trust fund in order to create a fund with enough assets to cover future benefits
given estimated taxes collected and a reasonable rate of return on investments. Laurence S.
Seidman, Making the Case For FundingSocialSecurity, 81 TAX NOTES 241, 245 (1998). The lack of
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oil and gas revenues 6 and by Canada for its social insurance system.'7 The
Canada Pension Plan (CPP), and the government corporation which invests
on its behalf, has recently received interest from scholars and lobbying
groups as a potential solution for the U.S. funding problem."8
In the government corporation model, the $1.9 trillion in the Social
Security Trust Fund would be shifted to a federally owned corporation
which would then act as the investment vehicle for the Social Security
Administration. This solution presents a compromise between the
Republican and Democratic approaches to leveraging the private markets in
an attempt to fix the Social Security funding crisis. Although the Republican
administration favors personal accounts as a solution to the funding crisis,
centralizing investment through an FGC may appeal to the Republican
base since it promotes a key Republican ideology to adopt market solutions
for social problems yet still manages to limit government involvement
in the investment decision. Democrats might accept the compromise
solution since such a centralized investment model addresses many of
their objections to personal accounts. The risk of loss in stock market
investments is shifted away from the individual and diversified collectively
over several cohorts and among a greater number of investments. 9 The
centralized approach also maintains the collectivist character of Social
Security whereas private accounts would signal a return to private autonomy
rather than group responsibility."0 Moreover, both parties should find the
attention to this idea may be understandable since the phenomenon of a government-owned
corporation has not been widely studied in academia, see Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo
with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975,
981 (2005), despite the fact that Congress has authorized many private FGCs with even more
expected in the future. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 543 (1995).
16 THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2005), available at http:ll
www.apfc.org/iceimages/publications/2oo5.AR-nocov.pdf.
17 CANADA PENSION PLAN INV. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at I (2005), available at http://
www.cppib.ca/info/annual/ar-zoo5.pdf.
18 See R. Kent Weaver, Pension Reform in Canada: Lessons for the United States, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 4 5 , 73 (2004); Daniel Bd1and, The Politics of SocialLearning: Finance, Institutions, and Pension
Reform in the United States and Canada, 19 GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L J. OF POL., ADMIN., & INSTS.
559, 559-83 (2OO6), available at http://www.danielbeland.org/pubs/Governance%2o2oo6.pdf
(both articles suggesting that the Canadian experience in developing the CPP Investment
Board could hold valuable policy lessons for U.S. lawmakers). The politically powerful
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), a major player in derailing President Bush's
private accounts proposal, has recently showed interest in the CPP as an alternative to private
accounts. Am. Assoc. of Retired Pers., The Canada Pension Plan: A Model of Reform (April 2007),
http://www.aarp.org/research/international/events/aprI9_o7_.CPPIB.html; see also Nancy J.
Altman, Social Security and the Low-Income Worker, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1154-58 (2007)
(stating the Canada Pension Plan serves as precedent for "responsible investment in equities
by today's public pension plans").
19 Templin, Full Funding, supra note 14, at 419-24.
20 Id. at 4ol-07.
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solution palatable since investment is the best solution available to address
funding requirements while mitigating anticipated benefit cuts and tax
hikes.2" It should be noted that many commentators contend that Social
Security's funding problems can be addressed without investment through
"a combination of estate tax revenue financing, a higher taxable wage base,
and a higher normal retirement age.""2 However, this article focuses purely
on investment vehicles as one of the solutions to financing Social Security.
FGCs are not without their own set of problems, constraints and
controversies. Although widely used for a variety of legitimate public
purposes, FGCs are controversial because of constitutional questions
over the state action doctrine, nondelegation doctrine and Appointments
Clause. 3 Although there has been a trend in recent years to privatize
government services2 4 there are also normative questions regarding whether
such privatization actually results in efficiency gains. Finally, shifting
the nations' $1.9 trillion retirement nest egg into the hands of a private
corporation-even a government-owned one-is likely to be enormously
controversial given the recent past history of corporate manager and director
criminal malfeasance, nonfeasance, self-dealing and poor performance.
This article addresses those questions and issues and analyzes a prescriptive
solution whereby a privatized Social Security Trust Fund could operate
21 Id. at 415-19. Although investment might mitigate tax increases and benefit cuts,
the most realistic reform minded commentators state that some amount of tax increases and
benefit cuts are inevitable. Jeffrey R. Brown, Kevin A. Hassett, & Kent Smetters, Top Ten Myths
of Social Securty Reform, 13 ELDER L.J. 309,338 (2oo6).
22 Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental Restructuring of Incremental
Change?, I 1 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341, 341 (2007). "A combination of these three reforms
would retain the current structure of the system and distribute the costs of reform so that
no single class of participants or beneficiaries would bear the entire brunt of reform." Id.
There are numerous combinations of how taxes and benefits should be adjusted. Some
proposals combine tax and benefit adjustments with other retirement related reforms not
tied to Social Security funding. Professor Befort suggests that in addition to tax increases,
benefit adjustments, and an increase in the retirement age, that reforms also be made to
encourage a higher rate of participation and security in defined benefit contribution plans,
such as employer 401(k) plans, and by giving low and middle-income taxpayers a "modest
refundable tax credit that would encourage [them] to save for retirement." Befort, supra note
12, at 940. Still another proposal suggests that Social Security should incentivize workers to
work longer and save more by creating a two-tiered system where the first tier pays out a "basic
Social Security benefit to every older American" and a second tier which "would provide an
additional earnings-related Social Security benefit based on payroll tax contributions made
to individual accounts." Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work, 6S OHIO ST. L.J.
145, 183 (2004). Towards the end of motivating taxpayers to save and invest to supplement
Social Security benefits, Professor Medill suggests that the Social Security Administration
take on the role of educating the public in "how to plan, save, and invest for retirement."
Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 323, 326 (2007).
23 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 56o-61.
24 Id. at 546.
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within constitutional bounds and the corporate governance issues could
be resolved to hold the entity and its managers and directors accountable
while promoting a maximum return on investment.
Part I of this article explores the history and controversies that have
surrounded FGCs. Part II considers the constitutional and theoretical issues
facing FGCs as well as the normative issue of whether the privatization
trend is consistent with democratic principles. Part III offers a prescriptive
analysis of the corporate structure that comports with constitutional
requirements. Part IV continues the prescriptive analysis and considers
what legal regimes would hold a privatized Trust Fund accountable while
still giving managers freedom from the political process so that they can
make decisions that maximize the wealth of the trust.
I. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS:
HISTORY, TRENDS AND CONTROVERSIES
Historically, the United States-more than other governments-has
trusted the markets and private corporations to make decisions of "national
importance."25 In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 6 Justice Scalia
traces the history of the government chartered corporation. As early as the
18th century, the U.S. government was a shareholder in private corporations
whose purpose was to carry out public functions. 7 But it wasn't until the
20th century that government-owned corporations emerged in force.
8
The First World War 9 and the Great Depression 30 saw an increase in
the use of the government corporate entity in order to respond to the
national economic crisis. 3' During this era, the FGC was thought of as
an agency within the government which could take advantage of private
sector business practices better than the agency under which it operated.32
However, starting in 1962 with the creation of the Communications Satellite
Corporation (Comsat), the government sought to form entities outside the
influence of public agencies and the political process. 3  A slew of FGCs
25 Id. at 633.
z6 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
27 Id. "The first was the Bank of the United States, created by the Act of Feb. 25,
1791, ch. io, I Stat. 191, which authorized the United States to subscribe 20 percent of the
corporation's stock .... Id. at 386.
28 Id. at 388.
29 "In 1917 and 1918, Congress created, among others, the United States Grain
Corporation, the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, the United States Spruce
Production Corporation, and the War Finance Corporation. These entities were dissolved
after the war ended." Id. (citation omitted).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 390.
33 Id. at 391. Comsat was notable in that only 3 of the 15 directors on the board were
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followed Comsat and, in most cases, the enabling legislation specifically
stated that the corporations were not "agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government."3 4 Even though the statute might specify that the FGC was
not an agency, in some cases the federal government retained full control
of the board of directors.3
The purpose of any given FGC has varied from the provision of goods
and services3 6 to addressing the lending needs of various populations such
as farmers, homeowners or students37 to creating a private regulatory body
for the accounting profession.38 FGCs are predicted to grow in number3 9
since such "a corporation can more efficiently apply the techniques of
modern business management.40
In his seminal article on FGCs, Professor Froomkin identifies four
reasons for creating an FGC--efficiency, political insulation, subsidy
and subterfuge.4 1 Only the first two reasons-efficiency and political
appointed by the President. Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. ("[See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)); 42
U.S.C. § 2996d(e) (I) (Legal Services Corporation (LSC)), and ... were (unlike Comsat)
managed by boards of directors on which Government appointees had not just a few votes but
voting control"). As will be discussed in Part II infra, the degree of control that the government
retains is a turning point on whether the entity is a government actor for the purpose of
determining constitutional rights.
36 Id. at 388. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established to provide electrical
power and Amtrak was established to maintain the railroads for passenger use in a time of
economic decline for the transportation system. Id. at 383-84.
37 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 555-56. These FGCs go by a special designation known
as Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and include such entities as the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
(Farmer Mac), and the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae). The corporations
"benefit from specialized lending powers coupled with an explicit or implicit federal guarantee
which allows them to provide subsidized credit to, or for the use of, a target group." Id. at
555.
38 As part of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB which is pronounced as "peekaboo" by some) in
response to the corporate governance and accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom.
PCAOB has "broad governmental powers and responsibilities, including the authority to
register accounting firms . . . ; enact rules . . . inspect [accounting firms] . . . ; investigate
accounting firms . . . for possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal securities laws;
and impose discipline . . . including censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and
substantial monetary fines." Nagy, supra note 15, at 977-78 (citations omitted).
39 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 546. FGCs are part of a larger trend to privatize government
services. Professor Metzger notes that "[pirivatization is now virtually a national obsession."
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003).
40 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.16, at 65 (2d
ed. 2003).
41 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 557. Professor Froomkin notes that FGCs, such as the
GSEs, are created as a subsidy to a special interest group. Consequently, farmers and students
borrow money at a lower rate than if they had to go out into the market. Id. at 558-59. In
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insulation-concern the creation of a privatized Social Security Trust Fund.
The inefficiencies of government are often cited as one of the key reasons
to form an FGC.4" A government-run trust fund is likely to be subject to
political influence which likely results in lower returns. 43 Moreover, when
it comes to investing the assets of the Social Security Trust Fund, even big
government advocates are skeptical" of whether the entity that has created
the largest deficit in world history would deliver a return on investment
that is competitive with the marketplace.
The historic track record bears out the intuition that government is
more inefficient than an FGC. Some FGCs which are profit-oriented "have
a far higher return on equity than do most large private firms. '45 However,
critics suggest the results are misleading. While an FGC might be more
efficient than the government itself, the entities have some advantages over
the private sector since FGCs are "ordinarily immune from state tax; and
sometimes they have unique abilities to operate on [a] national scale."
46
Government employees are not likely to be as profit motivated as private
sector professional investors. In order to have the incentive to choose the
best investments, government employees would need to be subject to the
type of competition that exists between private companies in the mutual
fund or trust industry47-i.e. the pressure to maximize the portfolio drives
stock pickers to invest the time and effort into making wise investment
choices. At the closing bell on Wall Street every portfolio manager goes home
knowing that her performance is easily calculated. Without competitive
pressure, government managers will not likely take the calculated risks that
private investors would take to increase performance. Professional money
managers will be better equipped to do the research and make the decisions
on where to invest than government employees who are not incentivized
to seek higher returns. Such professional money managers, of course,
should be qualified. 48 If government employees do handle the investment
discussing subterfuge as a reason for establishing FGCs, Professor Froomkin notes that some
corporations are created as accounting devices to hide deficit spending since the "off-budget
items are usually excluded from the official total 'spent' by the government." Id. at 559.
42 Id. at 577.
43 See Angelis, supra note 9, at 292.
44 Weiss, supra note i I, at 999.
45 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 579.
46 Id. at 584. A privatized Trust Fund would surely have economies of scale and may
have some unfair advantages over other large investors-i.e. investment banks, retail investors,
mutual funds, etc. However, such unfair advantages may be viewed as normal in the market
when the government is viewed just as a competitor rather than a regulator of competition.
Id. at 576-77.
47 Id.
48 In writing about private accounts, Professor Weiss suggests that the professional
money mangers who would work with individuals be subject to the Investment Advisors Act
and provide a guarantee that they are not judgment proof. Weiss, supra note i i, at lou i.
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decisions, then such managers should be "professionally trained, highly
skilled, and selected on the basis of proven track records."49
Political insulation is probably the most imperative reason to privatize
the Social Security Trust Fund.50 "Congress may feel that a small single-
mission agency will be more zealous in furthering a given goal than a
department in a multimission agency."'" Moreover, the interference
of politics in the investment decision and corporate governance has led
to lower returns for state run pension plans.5 2 President Bush's position
could not have been made clearer when the President's Commission
to Strengthen Social Security issued its 2001 reports. The Republican
administration was adamant that government stay out of the investment
business.5 3 Consequently, the only politically feasible route to harness the
private markets to help build the Social Security Trust Fund is to take the
investment decision out of the hands of the government. One solution to do
that would be through President Bush's private accounts proposal, but that
too ran into political opposition from both Democrats and Republicans. s4
That leaves the FGC as the primary option in order to invest the Trust
Fund without government influence.
Although there has been a trend to privatize government services for
the purposes of efficiency gains and political insulation, administrative
law scholars have called for greater control and regulation of private actors
wielding government power.55 The scholarly literature shows a great deal
of disagreement over the normative question of whether the "advantages
of privatization are outweighed by its disadvantages." 6 The fear is that the
constitutional restraints on governmental coercive power are absent when
power is conveyed onto a private actor.5 7
49 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 132.
50 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 595. "For many years there has been a consensus that
certain areas of public life, notably the money supply, should be insulated from direct political
control and entrusted to autonomous bodies such as the Federal Reserve Board." Id.
51 Id. at 558.
52 Romano, supra note 8, at 8I i.
53 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN Soc. SEC., supra note 7, at i i.
54 See Calmes, supra note 12, at A6.
55 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574
(2000).
56 Nagy, supra note 15, at 103o n.312.
57 Metzger, supra note 39, at 1371-72. Professor Metzger notes that one facile argument
makes the case that constitutional restraints on privatized government programs are not
needed since "the Constitution does not impose affirmative duties on government." Id. at
1405. Under this theory, since the government does not have a duty to provide benefits under
a program, "[wihy should it matter whether government programs become exempt from
constitutional constraints as a by-product of the government transferring these programs to
private hands?" Id. As Professor Metzger points out, though the government may not have a
duty to act, when it does act it must do so within constitutional boundaries. Id.
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Much has been written on government outsourcing of certain
government functions to privately owned corporations including
extensive commentary on Medicare and Medicaid Managed Care, welfare
privatization, the transition from public schools to charter schools and
private prisons.58 However, less has been written about the phenomena of
FGCs even though government-owned corporations are pervasive and give
rise to both normative and constitutional issues.5 9 One normative question
is whether the FGC "stands in tension with democratic values such as
accountability, transparency, and legitimacy."6 The principal constitutional
question is whether the corporate entity, although nominally private, is
considered to be a state actor when and if the entity infringes on a right
afforded by the Constitution.61 If the privatized Trust Fund was found to be
the government under the state action doctrine, then does that designation
lessen the ability of the Trust Fund to remain apart from political influence
in its investment decisions? The resolution of the issue is imperative as to
whether an FGC is a politically acceptable solution.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The Constitutional issues facing FGCs, as well as other sorts of privatization,
are complicated by the Supreme Court's reliance on the public-private
distinction, which posits that there is a clearly divided public sector subject
to constitutional and other public law constraints and a private sector
subject to private law rules. Administrative law scholars argue that the
public-private distinction results in an accountability problem given the
complex relationships between government agencies and private actors.6"
The inadequacy of current conceptions of constitutional constraints
on FGCs may require a rethinking of administrative law to embody
not only government oversight, but also contractual constraints and an
interdependent aggregate accountability involving "internal procedural
rules .... market pressures,... agreements ... with other actors, informal
norms of compliance, and third-party oversight. ' 63 Such a regime suggests
that there is an emerging new conceptualization of a "public/private" entity
subject to constitutional constraints in some instances and private law for
other purposes.64
58 See generally Metzger, supra note 39, at 1376-94.
59 See generally Froomkin, supra note 15; Nagy, supra note 15.
60 Nagy, supra note 15, at 980.
6I Id. at Io3o-31.
6z Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84
N.C. L. Rev. 397,405 (zoo6).
63 Freeman, supra note 55, at 665.
64 Nagy, supra note 15, at io6i.
2007-2008]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The threshold constitutional issue for FGCs is whether they are a
government actor under the state action doctrine. This article first examines
the state action doctrine then proceeds to analyze other constitutional
issues including the nondelegation doctrine and the consequences of being
a state actor. Throughout this analysis the article addresses the normative
question of whether FGCs in general and a privatized Trust Fund in
particular are consistent with democratic principles.
A. State Action Doctrine
Whether an FGC is a state actor or private actor is uncertain' s but the
answer to the question has ramifications for its "relationship with the
rest of the world: the President, Congress, the public, and even its own
directors." 66 The determination of an FGC's legal status as a public agency
establishes whether constitutional provisions such as due process constrain
the corporation. 67 If the entity is deemed to be a private corporation, then
the constitutional and legislative restraints placed on federal agencies do
not apply.68 Whereas, an FGC that is deemed a state actor is subject to the
same constitutional restraints and possibly, unless the legislation specifically
exempts the entity, the federal laws governing administrative agencies.
The doctrinal question of whether an FGC is a governmental entity
subject to constitutional constraints is answered through a state action
doctrine analysis, 69 which separates entities into two camps-the "state"
actor on which constitutional restraints are imposed and the private actor.
There is a growing body of scholarship which suggests that the public-
private distinction of the state action doctrine is anachronistic and does not
65 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 564. The answer turns in part on whether the Lebron
decision is controlling, given the purpose of the corporation and the appointment process of
its directors. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (995).
66 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 560.
67 Id. at 562.
68 Id. There is an additional question of whether federal laws which govern federal
agencies would apply to an FGC. It appears that if Congress specified in the enabling
legislation that the corporation was not a federal agency, then laws governing federal agencies,
such as the Administrative Procedure Act, would not apply. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394.
69 Professor Froomkin provides the framework to analyze the constitutional status of
government corporations. See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 563-69. The origins of the state
action doctrine find their basis in the post-Civil War Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
While the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude applied to
both public and private actors, the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process
clauses apply only to government action and not private actors. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.1 (3d ed. 1999).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "[nlo State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
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recognize that "expanded privatization has served to blur the distinction
between the spheres of public and private. '70 However, the Supreme Court
has not yet recognized the academic critique of the state action doctrine
and precedent clearly relies on a public-private distinction.
71
The traditional analysis for the state action doctrine asks whether "there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action"
that the action may be fairly characterized as one of the government.
7
However, constitutional law scholars have been critical of its application.73
To a large degree, the courts have been reluctant to find a state action even
in the presence of extensive involvement by the government.
74
Unlike most state action cases, FGCs require another layer of analysis."
Instead of inquiring into whether the action in question can be traced to the
state, the court added a preliminary question of whether the entity itself is
the state. 76 The controlling decision is Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.7 7 In Lebron, the Court held that when "the Government creates a
corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives,
and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the
directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for
70 Nagy, supra note 15, at 1030.
71 Id. at Io3o-31.
72 Id. at I033 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)). There
are actually several tests that have emerged from the Court but no single test has proven
"adequate to predict whether state action will be found in a new case." ROTUNDA & NOVAK,
supra note 69, § 16.5. Rather, the Court relies on a weighing of the facts and circumstances
of each case, though the predominant issue throughout the cases is "whether sufficient state
contacts do, or do not, exist." Id.
73 Nagy, supra note 15, at 1033.
74 Freeman, supra note 55, at 577 n. 124 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841
(1982)). Professor Nagy notes that state actions were found by the Court in three scenarios:
(i) when the challenged activity resulted from the government's
exercise of "coercive power" or "significant encouragement, either
overt or covert," (2) when the private entity performed a traditional
governmental function; or (3) when the challenged activity resulted
from a "symbiotic" interdependence between the government and the
private entity.
Nagy, supra note 15, at 1033 (citations omitted).
75 Froomkin, supra note i5, at 564.
76 Id.
77 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 3 7 4 (1995). In Lebron, a political activist
entered into a contract with an agent of Amtrak to display an ad on a prominent billboard sign
in New York City's Penn Station, which is owned by Amtrak, the defendant. Amtrak executives
later refused to honor the contract when they discovered the politically controversial nature




purposes of the First Amendment."78 In an 8 to 1 majority opinion, Justice
Scalia rejected the notion that Amtrak 9 was a private entity merely because
Congress designated it as such in the legislation creating the corporation. 0
Justice Scalia wrote that such a disclaimer in the enabling legislation could
certainly exempt an FGC from federal laws that Congress created8" and the
FGC would lose sovereign immunity status because of the disclaimer,82 but
that Congress could not "evade the most solemn obligations imposed in
the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form."83
Professor Nagy summarized the post-Lebron cases to conclude that
"lower courts have differed as to whether the Court's holding demands
application of a three-prong test or permits a more flexible analysis." 
4
The three-prong test states that: "[o]nly if (1) the government created the
corporate entity by special law, (2) the government created the entity to
further governmental objectives, and (3) the government retains permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation will the
corporation be deemed a government entity for the purpose of the state
action requirement." 5
In the more flexible analysis, courts would consider the "totality of the
circumstances" where "no one factor or set of factors [is] dispositive by
itself."8 6 In applying either test to a privatized Trust Fund, it is likely that
the corporate form would be deemed a state actor. Two of the prongs are
easily satisfied. Special legislation would need to be passed by Congress
and signed by the President to create the corporate entity.8 7 As will be
discussed in Part III below, a majority of the directors should be appointed
by the government given the size and importance of the Trust Fund. Thus,
the third prong would also be satisfied.
78 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
79 Amtrak is the common designation for the legal entity which is the defendant, the
National Railroad Passenger Corp.
80 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392. The enabling legislation for Amtrak states that the
corporation "will not be an agency ... or establishment of the United States Government." 45
U.S.C. § 541 (repealed 1994). This sort of disclaimer became more common for FGCs starting
in the i96os with Comsat. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390.
81 Justice Scalia notes that such a disclaimer would remove an FGC from oversight
of federal laws "such as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1988 ed.
and Supp. V), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § I et seq., and the laws
governing Government procurement, see 41 U.S.C. § 5 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V)." Lebron,
513 U.S. at 392.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 397.
84 Nagy, supra note 15, at 1040.
85 Id. (citing Horvath v. Westport Library Ass'n, 362 F3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004)).
86 Id. at IO4O n.377.
87 See discussion on formation infra notes 159-165 and accompanying text.
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The second factor of whether the government created the entity to
further government objectives could be reasonably debated, though in the
final analysis, this factor too weighs in the balance toward finding that a
government entity exists. In Lebron, the Court found that Amtrak furthered
government objectives by placing the entity into its historical context of
other government-created corporations. 8 The Court noted that FGCs have
been created to build the Panama Canal, 9 make distress loans during the
Great Depression,' and to insure bank deposits and liquidate the assets
of failed banks-all of which were considered furthering government
objectives. The Court also found that Amtrak was created to "avert the
threatened extinction of passenger trains in the United States" in the
interest of "public convenience and necessity."9
Certainly social insurance, in the form of Social Security, as a collectivist
response to the issue of poverty93 is a government objective. If it is a
government objective to make loans to individual citizens during a time
of economic crisis, then an entity created to further the funding of poor
peoples' retirement is likewise a government objective. Although providing
for retirement is also the province of traditionally private entities, such as
insurance companies, mutual funds, etc., the literature on the development
of Social Security is replete with references that in the 1930s, it was
recognized that government had a role to play in providing a safety net for
its elderly poor.'
The Court, however, has also found that some FGCs do not operate
to further a government objective. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, Justice Powell noted that "[t]his Court also
has found action to be governmental action when the challenged entity
performs functions that have been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' of
the Federal Government."95 However, the Court declined to find that the
88 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386.
89 Id. at 387.
90 Id. at 388.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 383-84.
93 See MARK HYDE & JOHN DIXON, Welfare Ideology, the Market and Social Security: Toward a
Typology of Market-Oriented Reform, in TIE MARKETIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY I (John Dixon
& Mark Hyde eds., 2ooI).
94 DANIEL BtLAND, SOCIAL SECURITY: HISTORY AND POLITICS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
PRIVATIZATION DEBATE 63-64 (2005).
95 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987).
The case arose when an amateur gay and lesbian athletics association formed in 1981 with
the objective of holding the first "Gay Olympics." The USOC filed suit to prevent the
organization from using the name "Olympics." The Court noted that "[slection I iO of the
Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 36 U.S.C. § 380, grants [the] United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) the right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the
word 'Olympic' and various Olympic symbols." Id. at 526 (citation omitted). San Francisco
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United States Olympic Committee, a corporation chartered and funded in
part by Congress, was acting for the government since "[n]either the conduct
nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental
function."96 In a similar vein, investing in the private stock market is widely
considered-even by liberal advocates of social insurance-to not be a
function of the government. 97 Following this line of thinking, one might
analogize to the nondelegation doctrine cases, which address the issue of
whether some governmental powers cannot be delegated and should be
reserved to the government.
An argument can be advanced that if the function of the FGC is not
a traditional government function then the function does not threaten
individual liberty and should not weigh heavily when considering the
second prong of the Lebron test. In commenting on what constitutes a
governmental power, Professor Lawrence finds that "certain powers [are]
essentially governmental: rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of
person or property, licensing and taxation. ' 98 Criticism of the privatization
trend has for the most part focused on transferring authority to private
organizations which might inflict harm on due process rights, such as the
trend to privatize the provision of government funded health care benefits,19
federal prisons" and the ceding of government regulatory functions
in important areas like the accounting profession. 10 1 Here, there are no
regulatory functions being ceded to the Trust Fund. The Trust Fund's
corporate powers would be limited to investing Social Security assets into
a widely diversified portfolio of investments. While those investments-in
the aggregate-are likely to have broad positive macroeconomic effects,
the purpose behind the trust is not to create economic policy for the
government.102 Given that the government traditionally does not use tax
Arts & Athletics, Inc. challenged the exclusive use in part on an argument that the USOC was
a governmental actor.
96 Id. at 545.
97 Libertarians and many Republicans are adamant that it is not the role of the government
to invest in equities. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 7. Even
Robert Ball, the legendary New Deal Democrat and former SSA head, questioned the wisdom
of investing the Trust Fund in the market because of concerns over government's participation
in corporate governance, though he later supported the idea of limited investing in a broad
index that would represent the "entire American economy." EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, ROBERT
BALL AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 350 (2003).
98 See Nagy, supra note I5, at 977 n.5 (quoting David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of
Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648 (1986)).
99 See Freeman, supra note 55, at 594-625.
IOO Id. at 625-30.
Io See Nagy, supra note 15, at 975.
102 For a discussion of the broader macroeconomic consequences of investing the Trust
Fund in the markets, see Diamond, supra note 5, at 58 n.71; Seidman, Making the Case For
Funding Social Security, supra note 15, at 246; Bosworth & Burtless, supra note 3, at 6.
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revenues to make investments for the purpose of generating more income,
it can be argued that the creation of the Trust Fund was not furthering a
government objective.
Yet in all likelihood, the government objective of Social Security will
not be judged in such narrow terms. The objective of the Trust Fund is
not to foster private investment for its economic gains. Rather, the larger
objective is clearly the government's interest in the funding crisis facing
the collectivist program of Social Security-clearly a government objective.
Moreover, San Francisco Arts &Athletics, Inc. v. UnitedStates Olympic Committee
can be distinguished from the present case. First, the Court was split on
the issue of whether the USOC performed a "traditional governmental
function." Justice Brennan, in the dissent, argued that the USOC did
perform a "traditional governmental function" by representing the United
States within the international community at sporting events. "Although
the Olympic ideals are avowedly nonpolitical, Olympic participation
is inescapably nationalist." 103 The majority also noted that the U.S.
government did not maintain control over the USOC, whose governance
structure is independent.'°4 If San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee were decided under Lebron, it would probably fail
the third prong of the three-part test since the government did not appoint
a majority of the directors.
Even under the stricter three-prong test used by courts interpreting
Lebron, it is likely the Trust Fund would be deemed a state actor since all
three elements are present. In this case, the corporation would take on a
status like that of Amtrak-i.e. a "public/private entity" 105 not unlike an
agency but formed in the private sector to take advantage of techniques
and political insulation that public agencies cannot achieve. Justice Scalia
commented on the unique character of such a corporation when discussing
the government corporations formed in the 1930s and 1940s to address the
needs posed by the Great Depression and World War II.
A remarkable feature of the heyday of those corporations ... was that, even
while they were praised for their status "as agencies separate and distinct,
administratively and financially and legally, from the government itself,
[which] has facilitated their adoption of commercial methods of accounting
and financing, avoidance of political controls, and utilization of regular
procedures of business management," it was fully acknowledged that
they were a "device" of "government," and constituted "federal corporate
agencies" apart from "regular government departments. ,,106
103 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 550
(1987).
104 td. at 545 n.27.
105 See Nagy, supra note 15, at 1038.
io6 See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1995) (citing C.
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So, while the Trust Fund might be considered a state actor for
constitutional purposes, it can be, absent another decision by the Supreme
Court, given the appropriate legislation by Congress designating it as
such, 107 a private actor for all other purposes.
B. Nondelegation Doctrine
Another possible constitutional constraint on FGCs is the nondelegation
doctrine.0 8 The constitutional provisions of due process and separation of
powers gave rise to the nondelegation doctrine which prevents a delegation
of congressional "legislative power to other institutions, whether public or
private."'0' The doctrine, however, seems to be rarely used to constrain
congressional delegation of policy making power to administrative agencies
so long as Congress "lay[s] down ...an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to take action is directed to conform."" 0
Scholars contend that the rare use of the doctrine is "troubling because
administrative agencies are less accountable to the public than Congress or
the President."' The nondelegation doctrine also proscribes congressional
delegation of legislative power to private entities, though most delegations
seem to be upheld."'
It is unlikely that a privatized Trust Fund would be held constitutionally
invalid under the nondelegation doctrine. Scholars contend that the
modern nondelegation doctrine, as an offspring of the separation of powers,
"is primarily concerned with congressional actions that aggrandize its
own power at the President's expense.""' 3 If a delegation merely lessens
presidential power, then it is less likely to be held unconstitutional." 4 Here,
the decision making power to invest the Trust Fund assets shifts from
Herman Pritchett, The Government Corporation ControlAct of 1945, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 495,
495 (1946))-
107 Justice Scalia noted in Lebron that a congressional designation in the enabling
legislation of a FGC that the entity was not an agency of the government would likely exempt
the FGC from the constraints imposed by federal legislation limiting the ability of agencies to
contract, setting up reporting relationship and other actions. Id. at 394.
io8 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 574-
109 Nagy, supra note 15, at 1057.
11 Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928)).
i ii Id. at io58.
112 While the leading case invalidating delegation of state power to private entities
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), has not been overruled and is "alive in theory, it
is all but dead in practice. Almost all private delegations (of state power] are upheld." Metzger,
supra note 39, at 144o. Certain government functions remain "nondelegable, or at least not
delegable without continuing government oversight." Verkuil, supra note 62, at 42 1.
113 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 576.
114 Id.
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the executive branch to a private entity. Such an action does not increase
congressional authority and therefore should be held constitutional.
Moreover, the power to invest Trust Fund assets is not the type of
delegation that the Supreme Court is concerned with in applying the
nondelegation doctrine since investing fund assets is not legislating,
issuing regulations or a power traditionally reserved to the states. A more
controversial transfer of government power to a private entity is the creation
of private prisons, since "the right to physically constrain and coerce others
is ordinarily reserved for the state."1"5 An argument could be made that
the use of $1.9 trillion in government funds to invest in the market acts
as a form of regulation. With such a large amount to invest, the Trust will
likely be able to set market prices or otherwise compete where others
cannot. However, as Professor Froomkin notes, "[c]ompetition alone, even
competition by an FGC powerful enough to set the market price, is not a
constitutional violation."
116
Professor Metzger argues that control over government resources, such
as Medicare benefits, is considered government power when in the hands
of the government, so the transfer of such power to private hands "does not
inherently change the nature of the power at issue." 1 7 However, clearly the
potential for coercive behavior would be less when the government cedes
management of the Trust Fund to a private corporation for investment
purposes than when the government transfers resources, such as the
delivery of Medicare benefits, to a private third party. In the latter case,
the private corporation is making decisions on the allocation of benefits;
whereas in the former, the corporation is attempting to create wealth for
funding programs and leaving the allocation decision to the government.
Professor Metzger proposes a new private delegation doctrine in
order to address the deficiencies of the state action doctrine.'18 Professor
Metzger uses agency theory to identify areas where a state delegation
of government power amounts to a principal-agent relationship which
demands accountability of the principal-i.e. the government-for the
agent's actions.I 9 Under this proposed analysis, if a private actor is wielding
government power, then appropriate accountability mechanisms must be
put in place so that the exercise of that power comports with constitutional
requirements.' "If such mechanisms are lacking, the appropriate judicial
response is not subjecting private entities to direct constitutional scrutiny,
but instead requiring that the government create such mechanisms as the
constitutionally-imposed price of delegating government power to private
115 Metzger, supra note 39, at 1397.
116 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 577.
117 Metzger, supra note 39, at 1399.
118 Id. at 1501-02.
19 Id. at 1464.
120 Id. at 1374.
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hands."' 1 If the government still does not create such mechanism, then
it is the delegation of authority to the private actor which is found to be
unconstitutional rather than the designation of a private entity as a state
actor.' Since this article proposes that the Trust Fund concede that it
is a state actor for constitutional purposes, the constitutional rights that
Professor Metzger seeks to protect should be enforceable through a judicial
action so long as the party has standing.
C. Consequences of Being a State Actor
If the Trust Fund is found to be a state actor, what are the constitutional
implications? Given that a privatized Trust would not be engaged in
traditional governmental regulatory or investigative functions, there are
likely only four primary constitutional constraints: (1) the FGC must give
employees the constitutional rights of other governmental workers,1 3 (2)
the enabling legislation must comport with the Appointment Clause of
the Constitution,"4 (3) the organization must not violate the "structural
safeguard" provided by the separation of powers doctrine,2 5 (4) in some
limited circumstances the Trust Fund could be subject to a Takings Clause
challenge in the event that the fund was accused of underbidding for
an asset. Aside from the question of employees, Fifth Amendment due
process rights and First Amendment free speech rights of other citizens are
not likely to be infringed from the buying and selling of assets. Congress
would not be delegating rule-making power or regulation power as it might
to an administrative agency; therefore, the Trust Fund is not likely to be
put in the position of ever denying a citizen any constitutional due process
or free speech rights. Rather, the purpose of the corporate entity is merely
to invest the funds in order to help achieve solvency for the Trust Fund.
For each of the four constitutional issues mentioned, one primary
concern is whether the constitutional requirements interfere with the
principle of political insulation. The purpose of the privatization of the
Trust Fund is to achieve political insulation in the investment decision and
voting of shares. If these constitutional requirements inhibit that goal, then
some other structure is needed.
As to the first issue-protecting government employee constitutional
rights-there is little concern that this would impact the goals of political
insulation. In writing about the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) and its probable status as a state actor, Professor Nagy
identifies three possible ways in which the entity must protect workers'
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Nagy, supra note 15, at Io44.
124 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 609; Nagy, supra note 15, at 1o49.
125 Nagy, supra note 15, at 1053-54.
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constitutional rights, including: (1) a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
protection to "protect... employees from being disciplined or terminated
without the opportunity for a hearing," (2) guarantees of freedom of
speech under the First Amendment to "protect [an employee's] ability to
criticize elected officials (including the President)" and (3) "the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures may afford
... employees a zone of limited privacy in the workplace (prohibiting, for
instance, mandatory random drug testing)."'2 6 None of these protections for
individual employees should affect the goal of political insulation. To the
contrary, First Amendment freedom of speech rights and Fifth Amendment
due process rights may actually strengthen the political insulation by giving
the directors and managers of the Trust Fund more latitude in what they
say publicly and more security in the knowledge that their job safety rests
on performance and not on politics. Moreover, the Trust Fund, like any
employer, could strengthen due process rights for its employees beyond
those afforded public employees through private contract law."7
As to the second issue, if the Trust is a state actor, then it must comport
with the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution provides that the President shall appoint all officers of the
executive branch with the advice and consent of the Senate."8 Congress
may delegate the appointment of "inferior Officers" to the President,
the courts or heads of departments. Thus, if the board and managers of a
privatized Trust Fund were deemed to be inferior officers, the appointment
process could bypass the political process of a Presidential appointment
with advice and consent of the Senate.
The courts and Constitution provide little guidance in determining
whether a particular position is that of a principal officer or inferior officer. 9
In Mor7ison v. Olson, the majority considered three reasons in determining
126 Id. at 1044-45.
127 Id. at 1045.
128 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In addition to the two categories of officers and inferior
officers, a third subordinate category of employee, who are not subject to the Appointments
Clause, has emerged "[as a pragmatic concession to the needs of the government bureaucracy."
See ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 69, § 9.4.
129 "The line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear, and
the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. ('In the practical course of
the government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are and who are
not to be deemed inferior officers, in the sense of the Constitution, whose appointment does
not necessarily require the concurrence of the senate')." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671
(1988) (citation omitted). Despite the lack of an absolute test to determine who is an inferior
officer, the court has, at times, created a laundry list of types of offices that are not principal
officers. "Among the offices that we have found to be inferior are that of a district court clerk,
an election supervisor, a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the consul, and
a 'United States commissioner' in district court proceedings." Edmond v. United States, 520
U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (citations omitted). The Court also noted that "the independent counsel
created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978" was an inferior officer. Id.
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whether an office was an inferior officer: (1) whether the officer was
"subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official," (2) the extent
to which the officer is "empowered by the Act to perform only certain,
limited duties" and (3) if the officer was "limited in jurisdiction" and
"limited in tenure."'' 30 Following his textualist tradition, Justice Scalia, in
his dissent, argued that "one is not an 'inferior officer' within the meaning
of the provision under discussion unless one is subject to supervision by
a 'superior officer."' 3 Justice Scalia argued that while this standard was
not a "sufficient condition," it was a "necessary condition."'32 In Edmond
v. United States, Justice Scalia, now writing for the majority, stated that "in
the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative
to important Government assignments, we think it evident that 'inferior
officers' are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate."'
33
It is not likely the directors of a $1.9 trillion and growing Trust Fund
for America's most favored entitlement will be considered a job of an
inferior officer for constitutional purposes. The appointment of such an
important social, economic, and politically sensitive position is not likely
to be delegated to other principal officers. Instead, the President is likely
to want direct control. Thus, Scalia's "necessary condition" that is required
to find a position to be an inferior officer would not be met. Moreover,
from a populist perspective, the average American, given their self-interest
in the outcome of the performance of the fund, will more likely follow
the performance of the Trust Fund with keener interest than the acts of
the Secretary of State or even the President. It is not likely the electorate
would stand for any lower status and would demand the people who run
the Trust Fund be held accountable through the political process.
Consequently, to the extent that the Trust is a public agency and
therefore subject to the constitutional requirements of appointment of
officers, any attempt to move the appointment process out of the hands of
the President would undermine the President's constitutional power. 34 In
the landmark Appointments Clause case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court
held that Congress could not "usurp for itself the President's appointing
130 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
131 Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 722.
133 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
134 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 6io. Although he admits that the "possibility ... is
remote," Professor Froomkin argues that any designation of a federal government agency as
a private actor would mean that "[theoretically, Congress could authorize the Speaker of the
House, or a congressional Joint Committee, to appoint directors of an FGC. The consequences
would devastate presidential power." Id.
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authority."' 35 The Court would even go to the lengths of invalidating the
actions of an "agency headed by an invalidly appointed official"' 36-- a
course of action that could be harmful for the financial health of the Trust
Fund if the entity were compelled to unwind investments before the value
had been received.'
37
As the head of the executive branch, the President has "formal control
over most federal agencies" and his plenary power extends not only
to appointment but also to "remove nearly all[] principal officers in the
executive branch."' 3 The exceptions to the rule of removal are found in
several independent agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, SEC, FBI and
CIA among others, for which the President appoints a head for a fixed term.
The head can only be removed for cause. 13 9 Setting up a system for the
Trust Fund which comports with the Appointments Clause yet maintains
political insulation will be discussed in Part III below.
As to the third issue, the Trust Fund's oversight, reporting structure
and corporate organization must not violate any of the structural
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers' or it will be declared
unconstitutional. Any legislation authorizing a privatized Trust Fund
would need to make certain that the structure does not infringe on power
ceded by the Constitution to the President "to 'take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.""' .4' The uncertain status of FGCs may also affect
congressional oversight of government administrative agencies.' 41 Specific
controls to address separation of powers issues, such as the voting of shares
in the corporation, will be discussed in Part III below.
As to the fourth issue, some limited circumstances that occur in hostile
corporate takeovers may lead to accusations that the Trust Fund engaged
in a Fifth Amendment "taking" requiring "just compensation." Eminent
domain allows the government to take private property for a public use.
This power is limited by the Fifth Amendment, which provides that private
property will not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." 143 In
the context of a Trust Fund acquisition of corporate stock, issues arise as to
whether a taking occurred. If that issue is resolved, then it's likely that the
public use requirement will be satisfied given the goal of the Trust Fund
135 Id. at 6o8 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127-28 (1976)).
136 Id. at 608-o9 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142).
137 A buy and hold strategy will typically return more for an investor since transaction
costs of trades cut into the yield on returns.
138 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 6o8.
139 Id.
14o Nagy, supra note 15, at 1054.
141 Id. at 1055-56.
142 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 548.
143 U.S. CONST. amend V.
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to provide funding for social insurance.'" Thus, the remaining issue would
be whether the Trust Fund gave just compensation when it acquired the
shares.
Typically, the purchase of an asset on the open market by the
government does not constitute an exercise of eminent domain. When the
government negotiates to purchase pencils at a discount from a supplier,
the transaction is merely bargaining in the marketplace and the supplier
is free to reject the government's offer. However, in the context of hostile
takeovers, some coercive corporate tactics might be construed as takings
when the acquirer is a government actor. Large hedge funds routinely use
financial leverage to take over troubled corporations. These buy-out funds
might make a tender offer for a company which is trading at or below book
value, sell off some of the assets, and manage others in a way to make
them more profitable than the previous owners. During a hostile takeover,
often the management of the target company and/or minority shareholders
resist the takeover attempt. Removing managers and directors who resist
a takeover requires that the acquirer gain effective control of the board of
directors and then comply with both statutory and contractual procedures
regarding removal. The percentage ownership needed to gain effective
control of a board depends on the articles of incorporation, bylaws, classes
of share and other factors that can effectively cede control to a shareholder
or group of shareholders even if they own less than a majority of the shares.
In contrast, forcing a sale of stock by minority shareholders requires that
the buyer of the shares either possess a contractual right (such as a right of
redemption) or a statutory right to purchase the shares. Most state statutes
allow a 90% majority shareholder to compel minority shareholders to sell
their shares in what is commonly called the "short form merger."' In the
short form merger, minority shareholders who dissent to the forced sale
typically have "appraisal rights" where the court makes a determination
whether the shareholders received the "fair value" for their shares. 146 If a
privatized Trust Fund began to buy out troubled companies, such dissenting
144 The U.S. Supreme Court recently expanded the powers of eminent domain in Kelo v.
City of New London when it held that the "public use" requirement was satisfied even when the
government planned to transfer the property from one private owner to another who would
make better economic use of the property. 545 U.S. 469, 483-84 (2005) (holding that economic
revitalization of a residential area was a legitimate reason for eminent domain). Given the
collectivist nature of social insurance, acquiring a company for the purpose of funding the
program would clearly benefit the public and satisfy the public use requirement. That said, in
no way does this article suggest that a privatized Trust Fund should be imbued with eminent
domain powers. In fact, the enabling legislation should prohibit the exercise of such powers if
this is a concern among lawmakers.
145 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2007).
146 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262. If there is a public market for the shares, then the
price at the time of merger is deemed to be the fair value. Id. Such a cause of action would be
covered by the state law of the target company.
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shareholders who are forced to sell might argue that the sale was really a
government taking and later dispute the buy-out price as to whether it was
"just compensation" in the hope that the standard of just compensation
under a constitutional cause of action would yield more than that afforded
by corporate law's appraisal rights.147
Similar to the "appraisal rights" available under a corporate law regime,
"just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment merely requires that the
government give "market value fairly determined." 148 Scholars, however,
have suggested that the constitutional fair market value standard under-
compensates since owners may incur economic losses not compensated
by the purchase price (e.g. transaction costs incurred by replacing the
item purchased), the purchase price, although deemed to be the market
value, may not reflect the owner's justified valuation, and subjective
losses as to sentimental value and dignitary harms. 149 In the corporate
law context, commentators have also suggested that appraisal rights
might under-compensate minority shareholders since behavioral finance
theory suggests that the public markets-the key indicator of fair market
value-include irrational actors who routinely misprice securities.50 Under
current standards, however, courts are likely to view recovery under either
a corporate law regime or a constitutional regime as netting out to the
same number-i.e. the fair market value of the shares as determined by
the public market. Consequently, in order to recover economic losses not
reflected in the fair market value plus subjective losses a plaintiff would
need to persuade the court that scholars are correct and those losses should
be recoverable in the takings context because the right being protected is a
constitutional one. Courts are likely to reject such an argument since a sale
forced by a government entity seems less coercive if the same sale could
have been compelled by a private actor. Even so, the ability of plaintiffs
to plead a takings challenge might add to the litigation costs of the Trust
Fund. For these reasons, it is might be best to avoid the scenario entirely
147 Although the property being discussed here is stock in a company rather than land,
the Takings Clause applies since the government would be physically taking title to the asset.
Frank I. Michelman, Propery, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 H~Aiv. L. REv. 1165, 1 j84-85 (1967).
148 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,374 (1943) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
149 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Doman, 1o5
MicH. L. REv. 1o, 1o6-o9 (2006). The article provides an overview of scholarship which
suggests increased awards but rejects such hypotheses arguing that in public use takings
"overcompensation may become problematic... when it undermines resistance to questionable
projects." Id. at 142. In most eminent domain proceedings federal law provides that there
must be precondemnation bargaining over the price of the asset before resorting to eminent
domain. In some litigation, citizens have protested the use of pre-condemnation bargaining as
attempts by the government to "force them out for pennies on the dollar." Id. at 127.
15o Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WAsH. &
LEE L. REV. 767, 772-86, 833-34 (2002).
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and prevent the Trust Fund statutorily from purchasing all of the stock in
a company. Such a strategy avoids other possible constitutional law issues
though there are trade-offs in terms of possible returns which are discussed
in more detail in Part IV(D)(1)."'5
D. Towards New Identity: The Public-Private Entity
Since the Trust Fund is likely to be designated a state actor, it might best
be designated as a "public/private" entity.' Professor Nagy describes
the PCAOB as a public/private entity, which is "public for purposes of
the rights, liberties, and structures protected by the Constitution, and
private for other purposes." ' 3 Applying the public/private entity label to
the Trust Fund should not affect the political insulation needed for active
investing; yet it would subject the entity to constitutional accountability.
It may be wise to designate the Trust Fund as an independent agency
of the federal government, even though it would technically be a private
corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is structured
in this fashion."M In this way, the constitutional uncertainty is bypassed.
151 The possibility of the Trust Fund actually being the sole shareholder of a for-profit
corporation brings up other constitutional law issues beyond the possible takings problem
since such sole ownership would likely impute state actor status to those corporations. For
example, if the Trust Fund bought out a corporation that owns and leases space on billboards,
as in Lebron, and a court found that the Trust Fund operated as an owner, then the same First
Amendment analysis in Lebron would apply to the wholly owned subsidiary of the Trust Fund.
Such constitutional restraints on a subsidiary could lead to a devaluation of the subsidiary's
worth thereby defeating the principle aim of the entity-i.e. to maximize the wealth of the
Trust Fund.
152 Recently, there have been several calls from administrative law scholars for a
jurisprudence that takes into account a public-private or quasi-public entity. Administrative
law scholars have actively suggested alternative theories to deal with the public-private
dichotomy. Professor Metzger recognizes the realities of the nondelegation doctrine and
suggests that an agency relationship between public and private actors be imposed in order
to preserve constitutional accountability. See Metzger, supra note 39, at 1369-76. Professor
Minow's examination of public accountability for privatization efforts suggests that to
maintain pluralistic values and constitutional accountability, there need to be creative ways
to ensure full disclosure of information regarding privatization and participation by citizens in
the process. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1270 (2003). Professor Freeman proposes that the realities of public-private
interdependence require a rethinking of administrative law to embody not only government
oversight, but also contractual constraints and an interdependent aggregate accountability
involving "internal procedural rules .... market pressures,... agreements ... with other
actors, informal norms of compliance, and third party oversight." Freeman, supra note 55, at
664-65. Professor Verkuil provides arguably the most concrete solution by examining how
existing legislation and administrative rules might be strengthened to prevent the delegation
of "inherent[ly] government[al] activities." Verkuil, supra note 62, at 467-69.
153 Nagy, supra note 15, at Io61.
154 Professor Nagy compares the PCAOB with the FDIC to further her argument that
the PCAOB should be designated as a state actor. Nagy, supra note 15, at 1027.
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The corporation is deemed a state actor legislatively for purposes of the
U.S. Constitution. The upside is that it avoids the inevitable litigation
on the question of whether the Trust Fund is treated like an agency for
purposes of constitutional question. However, in order to leverage the best
of the private side of corporations-taking advantage of commerce-while
maintaining political insulation, the entity should be exempt from many of
the constraints of public agencies. Republicans and libertarians may feel
more comfortable with centralized investing if the entity is deemed, much
like Amtrak and other FGCs formed after the 1960s,'55 specifically not to
be an arm of the government in order to give greater protection against
pressure for politically motivated investments. Such a designation will not
ultimately exempt the Trust Fund from constitutional constraints, though
it might make the privatization process more politically feasible.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AN INCORPORATED TRUST FUND
The challenge in privatizing the Social Security Trust Fund is whether an
organization can be structured to achieve the optimum returns of investing
in the market without political interference yet still maintain "democratic
values such as accountability, transparency, and legitimacy."1 16 The structure
of such an organization would have to comport with the Constitution
but also be flexible and independent enough to take advantage of the
"commercial methods of accounting and financing, . . . and utilization
of regular procedures of business management."157 Thus, while the
organization would meet the structural constitutional requirements and be
held accountable for infringement of personal liberties as much as a public
agency, the privatized Trust Fund could still seek to "insulate [trustees]
from the political process."'
5 8
This article will first examine corporate formation requirements
for a privatized trust fund-i.e., the enabling legislation and choice
of legal regime issues for legal problems that arise. The article then
inquires into the thorny problem of keeping politics out of the board of
director appointment and removal processes while still comporting with
constitutional requirements.
A. Corporate Formation
The authority of the federal government to create a private corporation to
carry out a public purpose comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause
155 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)-
156 Nagy, supra note 15, at 980.
157 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394-95.
158 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 140.
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of the Constitution and the landmark Supreme Court case McCulloch v.
Maryland."s9 Instead of operating as a federal agency, the entity would
operate like as a private corporation not unlike the U.S. Post Office,
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) or Amtrak. 160 Though widely perceived
as not profitable (especially in the case of Amtrak), such government
corporations need not operate at a loss. In the fiscal years from 2004 to 2006
the U.S. Post Office had annual net income running from $900 million to
over $3 billion.
1 61
The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 requires an act of
Congress to create an FGC. 16 1 Such legislation would create the FGC
as a legal person separate from the government for all purposes except
for applicable constitutional restraints as discussed above and any
applicable statutes that might apply to government agencies which the
enabling legislation does not exempt. Normally, one purpose in creating a
corporation is to remove liability from the shareholder for corporate debts
and obligations. To the extent that the privatized Trust Fund is deemed to
have a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of Social Security, that duty would
not relieve the federal government of political responsibility for funding
the program under the Social Security Act.
While the FGC must be authorized by federal statute, the corporate
regulatory regime for an FGC is governed by the federal charter or "may
specify incorporation under the laws of the District of Columbia."'63
However the federal enabling legislation could specify that only certain
provisions of the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act (BCA)
apply to the FGC. Amtrak is a perfect example of this FGC structure.
Although the District of Columbia BCA provides the appointment of
159 Froomkin, supra note i5, at 551. The Necessary and Proper Clause states that, among
other enumerated powers, Congress shall have the power "[tlo make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I8. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,325-26
(I819), the court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution conferred
upon the government the power to create a private corporate entity to handle the nation's
banking needs despite the fact that such authority was not among the enumerated federal
powers. Froomkin, supra note 15, at 55I.
16o Each example corporation was created in a different manner. The Post Office was
spun out from an agency; whereas Amtrak was taken over from a private enterprise. The TVA
was created from scratch. ALFRED E CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 141 (1976).
161 U.S. POSTAL SERV., 2006 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2oo6),
available at http://www.usps.com/financials/-pdf/anrpt2oo6_final.pdf. Commentators dispute
whether the earnings are comparable to private industry since the Post Office is exempt from
taxes and certain other costs.
162 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2000). The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 was
passed because of concerns of accountability over the large number of FGCs created during
World War II. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 389-90.
163 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 552.
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directors, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 which created Amtrak
trumps the District of Columbia BCA by specifying how directors are to be
selected."6 Given the sui geneis nature of the Social Security Trust Fund
as a private entity, federal legislation should probably define many if not
most of the parameters of the corporate body, its powers and appointment
of officers rather than the District of Columbia BCA. Although the BCA
would certainly be a fine fallback position for any areas not addressed by
the enabling legislation. 16
Also, the enabling legislation need not mirror current statutes governing
FGCs. Principles found in nonprofit corporation law or, in the case of
the Social Security Trust Fund, the law of trusts, may be necessary to
incorporate into the enabling legislation to ensure a robust and accountable
organization.
B. Appointments: Models for Success
Perhaps the greatest threat to political insulation is through the
appointment and removal of directors and officers for the privatized Trust
Fund. Since the privatized Trust Fund is likely a state actor, the process to
appoint directors must comport with the constitutional requirements of the
Appointments Clause,166 yet also provide for enough safeguards that the
Trust Fund is shielded from political influence on the investment decision.
The appointment and removal of directors of a corporation is generally
governed by the state's corporations' code as well as any provisions in the
articles of incorporation and bylaws. Here, the enabling legislation would
preclude the District of Columbia BCA for purposes of appointment and
removal. This article first examines the dangers of political appointees
and then discusses some entity models that have withstood political
interference, including the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and
the Federal Reserve Board. U.S. public pension plans also provide models
for the governance structure of a private Social Security Trust Fund.
Finally, this article proposes an appointments and removal model for
the Social Security Trust Fund which would comport with constitutional
requirements while minimizing the risks of exposing the Trust Fund to
political influence through the appointment process.
In her seminal article on public pension fund activism, Professor
Roberta Romano noted that appointments of board members to public
pension plans tend to "fall into one of three categories: gubernatorial
appointees; representatives elected by fund beneficiaries; and individuals
164 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385.
165 Any given charter for a FGC in the United States Code reads like a mix of articles of
incorporation, bylaws and the corporations' code of any given state. Seegenerally 36 U.S.C. §§
IOI-2401 (2000) (providing examples of Congressionally chartered corporations).
166 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 61o.
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named by virtue of their office." 167 When political appointments govern
the appointment process of trustees, investment decisions and voting of
shares become corrupted by political rather than economic concerns. In an
empirical study of fifty state pension funds, Professor Romano discovered
that a fund's earnings decrease when board membership consists of political
appointees.' 1 "This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that public
pension funds experience political demands that adversely affect their
performance." 69 Professor Romano noted that in the case of the California
public pension fund, Calpers, attempts have been made by Republican
governors to reorganize the board of trustees in order to reduce the fund's
shareholder activism. Calpers has routinely criticized management of
several large public companies over compensation packages 7 ' as well as
other issues. 7' Professor Romano concluded that "[tihe political affiliation
of a significant number of fund trustees renders public pension funds
especially vulnerable to pressure by other [government] officials."'72
Professor Romano concludes that "[i]t is quite possible that fund boards
comprised of political appointees will capitulate to local interest groups'
investing and voting demand in order to forestall frontal attacks on fund
organization and assets." 173
In contrast, boards consisting of members elected by beneficiaries yield
better performance 7 Professor Romano posits that politically appointed-
i.e. non-independent boards--choose social investments that are riskier
thus yielding a lower return; whereas independent boards choose "a
different asset allocation as well as a different mix within asset classes,"
thus yielding a more diversified portfolio that is likely to yield higher
returns.7 Thus, one method "to mitigate political influence on public fund
investments" is to require that at least some of the fund board members are
elected by beneficiaries. 7 6 In contrast, other commentators have made it
clear that "power must be vested in a nonelected, nonpartisan body." 177
167 Romano, supra note 8, at 8oo-oi.
168 Id. at 825.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 818.
171 See HILARY ROSENBERG, ATRAITOR TO HIS CLASS (1999).
172 Romano, supra note 8, at 8oi.
173 Id. at 819. Professor Romano looks at behavior by California public pension fund
giant Calpers in committing funds to public housing even after an unsuccessful attempt by
a Republican governor to replace the board. Despite the unsuccessful attempt, Calpers may
have been influenced by the governor's wishes in order to prevent further attacks. Id. at 818-
20.
174 Id. at 827.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 840.
177 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 132. Professor Solomon suggests that removal of a
manager be provided for in the event of malfeasance or nonfeasance and that the government
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Where the solution of beneficiary-elected board members might work for
a public pension fund, the prospect of establishing a nationwide election for
the forty-nine million people receiving benefits 78 from the Social Security
Trust Fund is daunting at best. One could have an election concurrent
with national elections so as to cut down on administrative costs, but the
likely result would be the politicization of the Trust Fund where the aim
of elected beneficiaries is to rid the Trust Fund of political influence. The
nominees would likely split out along party lines and seek endorsements
from their own party. The nomination process would probably be folded
into the current process for party nomination for an office and require a
certain minimum number of signatures on a petition or a vote by a caucus
in order to get on the ballot. Such a process would involve both state party
primaries and national elections. At the local level, parties would come
under pressure to put nominees for the Trust Fund board on a political
slate along with candidates for other offices. These nominees would then
be beholden to presidents, congressmen, governors and mayors for their
nomination and election. The nominees would need money in order to run
for election as well and this would likely come from donors, special interest
groups and other politicians. As a result, the eventual boards would be
more reliant and beholden to their political donors. Still, one would expect
that voters would take into account the financial expertise of a particular
candidate since their retirement income is at stake.'79 The downside may
be more of the cost incurred in elections rather than a decrease in the
quality of the candidates.
Moreover, the most troublesome problem is that an election of directors
by the beneficiaries of the Trust Fund may be unconstitutional and
undermine presidential power since such a process does not comport with
the Appointments Clause. 80 That said, the spirit of Professor Romano's
observation that beneficiary representation improves performance is that
an independent board performs better than a non-independent board-the
election of directors by beneficiaries is merely one path to an independent
board. The independence that fosters great performance might possibly
be maintained by providing requirements in the enabling legislation that
some director's seat appointments be made with the advice of interest
groups which represent the beneficiaries. Several models for success exist.
should purchase insurance or be willing to indemnify any significant losses caused by a
trustee. Id.
178 Referring to the number of people receiving benefits at the end of 2006. THE
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 11o-3o, at z
(2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRITRo7/tro7.pdf.
179 Romano, supra note 8, at 84o-4I.
I8o Froomkin, supra note 15, at 61o.
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The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) system holds a number of important
lessons for U.S. lawmakers who are intent on reforming the Social Security
Trust Fund. 8' In 1997, the CPP, the Canadian equivalent of Social
Security, was in nearly the same situation as that facing the U.S. Social
Security system now. CPP funding was based on a pay-as-you-go model
which restricted the investment of excess contributions to non-negotiable
government securities. The plan to move to a partially funded system
included reductions in benefits and increases in contribution, but the most
salient feature was an investment fund managed "at arm's length from
[the] government" through a private government-owned corporation. 82
The fund would seek higher returns by investing excess contributions in a
well-diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds.
The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) is the corporate
entity which invests the trust fund. The Canada Pension Plan Investment
Board Act (CPPIBA) governs the appointment of the directors to the CPPIB
by delegating the appointment power to the executive branch with certain
legislatively mandated restraints.'83 The structure of the appointment
process attempts to weed out political influence by requiring consultation
among a diverse set of stakeholders. The board consists of twelve members
including the chairman. The board has oversight over the day-to-day
manager and is also charged with establishing investment policies and
ethical and conflict of interest codes. Board members are selected by the
Governor in Council upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,
who is the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. Treasury Secretary. The Minister
vets candidates through a committee composed of representatives from
each province and one representative appointed by the Minister. The Act
mandates that the Minister give consideration to having representatives on
the board who represent the different regions of Canada and enough board
members who have "proven financial ability or relevant work experience."
Terms last for three years and are subject to "good behavior." Directors
may be reappointed. In an effort to remove government influence, no one
who works for the government or is a Canadian politician may be on the
board. 184 Although the government appoints the board, the board appoints
the day-to-day managers of the CPPIB.185 Consequently, appointments of
18i Weaver, supra note I8, at 73 (arguing that the Canadian system holds lessons not only
on funding through investment, but also on how benefits are assigned, and how default policy
shifts can create fail-safe devices for funding during times of political gridlock and in the rules
surrounding 40 1 (k) plans).
182 David W. Slater, Prudence and Performance: Managingthe Proposed CPP InvestmentBoard,
C.D. HOWE INST. 2 (Oct. 30, 1997), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/slater-i.pdf.
183 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 10 (1997).
184 Id.
185 CANADA PENSION PLAN INV. BD., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 78 (2007), available at http://
www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/Annual-reports/ar.2007.pdf.
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the people running the fund and making investment decision are at least
one step removed from the political process of appointment.
The Federal Reserve provides another model of appointment by the
executive branch in which politics is minimized.
C. Federalism, Representation and the Trust Fund
Although the Federal Reserve Board is an independent federal government
agency rather than an FGC, the Federal Reserve System has a quasi
public-private persona that helps inform how the Trust Fund might be
managed. Congress created the Federal Reserve System in order to
manage the nation's money supply.86 The organization operates as an
autonomous body within the government-having both public and private
roles. The Federal Reserve promotes its governance as a federalist system
in which decision making is divided between a centralized body (the
Board of Governors) and sub-units (the twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks). Both the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Banks share
responsibility for regulating the money supply through membership on the
Federal Open Market Committee.187 The twelve Federal Reserve Banks
are corporate entities where the shareholders are the member banks but
the Reserve System does not operate for a profit. All earnings are remitted
to the U.S. Treasury. For some purposes, the Federal Reserve Banks are not
considered to be part of the government. 188 Some governance characteristics
of the Federal Reserve System can serve as a model for a privatized Social
Security Trust Fund. Although the investment decision making structure
for privatized Trust Fund should likely be centralized rather than using a
federalist model, 189 the appointment process of the Federal Reserve System,
which takes into account representation of diverse economic and national
interests, would likely help generate national support and legitimacy for
the Trust Fund.
The appointment to seats on the Board of Governors is made by the
President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. In selecting the
186 12 U.S.C. §§ 221, 222 (2000).
187 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
& FUNCTIONS 3 (9 th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf complete.
pdf.
188 Courts have ruled that "the Reserve Banks are not federal instrumentalities for
purposes of the [Federal Tort Claims Act], but are independent, privately owned and locally
controlled corporations," in light of fact that direct supervision and control of each bank is
exercised by board of directors. Lewis v. United States, 68o E2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cit. 1982).
189 Using a federalist model for investment decisions (i.e. having both a centralized
investment board and regional boards) would likely be counter-productive to preventing
politically motivated investment which favors local companies. A more objective centralized
management would more likely be free from regional influence and thus optimize the wealth
of the Trust Fund. Templin, Full Funding, supra note 14, at 434-39.
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Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Act requires that the President give
"due regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial,
and commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the country."'90 The
Board of Governors is comprised of seven members who serve no longer
than one fourteen year term. The appointments are staggered such that one
term expires on every even-numbered year. 91 Even a two term President
can appoint only four of the seven members of the Fed. The Chairman
and Vice-Chairman serve four year terms and are also appointed by the
President with confirmation by the Senate. This system of appointment
is widely thought to be disassociated from the political process. 19 The
decisions of the Board of Governors of the Fed need no ratification by the
executive branch and the only oversight comes from Congress. While the
Federal Reserve must work within the economic objectives and policy
established by the government, the organization tends to describe itself as
being "independent within the government."'1 93
In applying the Federal Reserve appointment model to the Social
Security Trust Fund, the President would appoint members to the board
on staggered terms. It might make sense to limit any given President's
influence even more than the Fed to make sure that even a two term
President could not appoint a majority of the Board. If there were a nine
person board with eighteen year terms then only one seat would come up
every two years and even a two-term President could only appoint four
of the nine person board. This should reduce the possibility of stacking
the board with a majority for political purposes. Requiring the consent of
the Senate to the appointment will, by proxy, achieve the principles of
federalism in that each state will have a voice in the selection of the board
and ensure that regional considerations are taken into account.
The President should be required to consider regional representation
on the Trust Fund board in order to help generate national support and
legitimacy for the entity. The Canada Pension Plan recognized the need
for some regional input in comprising its board. The Canadian Minister of
Finance makes recommendations for appointments to the Board with the
advice of a committee comprised of representatives from each province."
One might envision a U.S. Social Security Trust Fund board comprised of
representatives from major regions (possibly mirroring the twelve regional
Federal Reserve Banks) in order to provide a check against the threat of a
19o Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2ooo). The Act also requires that the President
select only one member "from any one Federal Reserve district." However, it has been
opined that this phrase did not set out a residency requirement. 2 Op.Off. Legal Counsel 391,
391 (977).
191 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 187, at 4.
192 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at I6o.
193 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 187, at 2-3.
194 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 10 (1997).
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board weighted with New York investment bankers, Boston mutual fund
managers and Silicon Valley venture capitalists. 95 A board weighted only
with representatives from the two coasts could result in investments that
favored the two coasts. Similar to the CPPIBA, the enabling legislation
could require that the President consult with and review recommendations
by a board comprised of investment professionals from each state. The
investment professionals would be appointed by the governor of each
state and would be charged with vetting candidates. While this process
may add to the cost and time involved in choosing candidates, the layered
review process should ensure that politicization remains remote and that
each candidate has the background and experience required to be on the
board.
D. Other Requirements for Board Membership
Even if these measures are implemented, what if someone with political
clout but with no financial savvy gets appointed to the board? Minimum
requirements could be established for the job-i.e. they would need some
financial credentials in order to have the job.""
Once again, lessons can be learned from the CPPIB and the Fed.
The CPPIBA requires enough members on the board who have "proven
financial ability or relevant work experience .. .that the Board' will be
able to effectively achieve its objects."' 197 In terms of implementing such
a standard for the Trust Fund, one might require any board member to
be certified as a "Chartered Financial Analyst" by the CFA Institute.98
Common sense suggests that the President and Congress will take into
account the financial expertise of a particular candidate.' 99
This level of specificity, however, may preclude some expert candidates
from becoming members. Rather, factors to consider might include
195 A look at the map of the Federal Reserve regions reveals that the split heavily favors
eastern states (with five regions) while the west coast has only one, see FED. RESERVE BD.,
THE TWELVE FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2oo6), even though California has the largest economy of all of the states. Set
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, CAL FACTS 2004, http://www.lao.ca.gov/zoo4/cal-facts/2oo4-
calfactsecon.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
196 Romano, supra note 8, at 841.
197 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 10(4).
198 See CFA Institute Homepage, http://www.cfainstitute.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
The CFA runs a rigorous exam which certifies analysts in the areas of "ethical and professional
standards, tools and inputs for investment valuation and management, asset valuation, and
portfolio management and performance presentation." CFA INST., FACT SHEET, http://www.
cfainstitute.org/aboutus/pdf/CFAInstituteFactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
199 Professor Romano suggests that in the event that board members do not have financial
expertise, that lack of expertise could be supplemented with advisory councils composed of
investment professionals in order to make recommendations. Romano, supra note 8, at 841.
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academic credentials, professional credentials, work experience and
references. Although these safeguards may take away political pressure to
engage in social investing, there still is likely to be more pressure on such a
public fund when the economy is suffering than on a private fund.',,
Another alternative to depoliticize the appointment process, again by
legislative mandate, would be to appoint a bipartisan board of trustees.
Post Office appointments operate through this method. Of the nine
governors that the President can appoint to the eleven-person U.S. Post
Office Board of Governors, only five can come from the same political
party. In addition, the appointment process for the U.S. Post Office
Board of Governors is staggered like the Federal Reserve. 02 The Social
Security Trust Fund could adopt similar provisions though, anecdotally,
the perception is that most financial professionals who would excel at
investment favor the Republican party rather than Democrats. In reality,
there are enough skilled professionals in both parties to meet the needs
of a Board of Directors. Yet, this solution just mirrors the political process
rather than disassociating itself from it.
E. Removal: "At the pleasure of the President" or "For Good Cause"
Unfortunately, most of the statutes that authorize FGCs and a Presidential
appointment of directors do not provide for a mechanism to remove
the directors. All civil officers are subject to removal from office on
impeachment by Congress for "[c]onviction of, [tireason, [b]ribery, or other
high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors. ' ' 0 3 The Constitution is silent on the
matter of the President's power to remove; though, the Supreme Court
has noted "that as a constitutional principle the power of appointment
carried with it the power of removal" °4 Congress, however, can limit this
implicit removal power to require that the President have "cause" before
removing an officer in a "quasilegislative or quasi judicial agencies;" for
purely executive agencies, the President has full power of removal. 20 It is
the President's power to appoint and remove officers, which makes federal
agencies formally accountable to the executive branch.20 6 The enabling
legislation should provide a removal power to the President for cause and
designate that the officers of the corporation are public officials for purposes
of impeachment in the case of malfeasance or nonfeasance .
2 0
200 Id.
201 39 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
202 Id.
203 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
204 Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
205 Humphrey's Ex'r v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
2o6 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 6 o8.
207 Id. at 625.
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In summary, the appointment process can and should be an executive
process which is constrained through legislation. Appointments should be
staggered so as to be disassociated from the political process and ensure
that no sitting President has the ability to appoint a majority. In addition,
to avoid imbalance politically, restrictions should be drawn up which
prevent too many members from one political party serving on the board.
The President's choices would be subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate. However, given the importance of the Trust Fund, the President
would also be required to consult with a commission in which each state
has a representative. That commission would vet the candidates to make
sure that only those with financial experience significant enough to handle
the investment would be appointed to the board. The removal power of
the President and the impeachment power of Congress should be imposed
through the statute to ensure that Trust Fund employees can be removed
if they are underperforming.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY: POLICING THE CORPORATION
Accountability of managers and directors is a dominant theme in corporate
governance scholarship. In the wake of accounting scandals at leading
companies like Enron and Worldcom, mistrust of corporate executives
is at an all-time high. Putting the nation's retirement nest egg into the
hands of corporate managers is likely to be controversial and require a
number of controls in order to be politically feasible with the electorate.
Although FGCs are governed by the enabling legislation, corporate law
principles should form at least part of the legal regime holding the entity
accountable. Yet, some laws which might hold a privatized Trust Fund
accountable may also expose the entity to risk of political influence which
could lead to lower returns. Any regime developed to regulate a privatized
Trust Fund needs to strike a balance between accountability and freedom
from political influence. Such a regime is likely to draw upon corporate law,
administrative law, and constitutional law as well other disciplines. 08
The problems that arise in corporate mismanagement are rooted in
the common law of agency. One could view the corporation as an agent
for the shareholder, the principal. Under the common law of agency, the
principal exerts control over the agent, the agent has a duty and is liable
to the principal, and the principal is liable for acts of the agent when the
agent is acting with authority.09 However, given that the shareholder seeks
to shield himself from liability for the corporation's act, a disconnect has
occurred between the principal-shareholder and agent-corporation. The
2o8 K.A.D. Camara & Paul Gowder, Quasipublic Executives, 115 YALE L.J. 2254 (zoo6)
(calling for control mechanisms that arise from both constitutional law and corporate law in
order to regulate a new breed of "quasipublic executives").
2o9 RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 2.01, 7.04, 8.oI-.12 (2005).
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principal exerts little control over the agent's actions, and the agent is
accountable to the principal only in extraordinary situations.
To compensate for this lack of accountability, judges and lawmakers
developed a set of mechanisms within the corporate law doctrine to
prevent manager self-dealing, mismanagement and inefficiencies. These
mechanisms include: (1) shareholder voting rights and contractual regimes,
(2) market mechanisms (i.e. takeovers of inefficient firms), (3) judicial
remedies, such as the shareholder derivative lawsuit, (4) disclosure
requirements, and (5) government regulation. Despite the availability of
these mechanisms, corporate scholars are troubled that "[a] combination
of substantive doctrines and procedural requirements embodied in
corporate law has made it nearly impossible for shareholders to prevail
when challenging the decisions and practices of corporate management."'2 10
This lack of shareholder control over corporate decision making is made
more difficult when the corporation is an FGC and governance issues are
covered by constitutional law and the enabling legislation rather than a
well-developed body of corporate law."1 ' Unless the commonly used
mechanisms to control management are built into the enabling legislation,
the FGC may not be held accountable through either internal governance
or external policing. This article examines each of the five mechanisms
for policing the corporation and concludes that a higher standard of
accountability than what is available in current corporate law regimes is
necessary for corporate managers and directors of a privatized Trust Fund.
However, any regime should stop short of a direct principal-agent
relationship where the government exerts control over the Trust Fund.
Agency theory is useful in order to give a basis whereby the government
must set up systems of accountability to ensure constitutionality." '
However, direct control by the government destroys the political insulation
21o Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REv. I05, io8 (2oo6).
211 Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80
WASH. L. REv. 565, 6ol-02 (2005). Although discussing Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs) rather than FGCs, Professor Carnell notes that the enabling legislation for specific
GSEs is largely inferior to the generic banking and insolvency laws which are designed to
apply to many different firms. Professor Carnell contends that
[firaming laws generically promotes accountability. Without generic law,
the government tends to deal ad hoc with "each institution and set of
circumstances" in ways that tend to favor the narrow interests of the
institution's owners, managers, and clientele. Generic law "can help
to shift the political debate to questions about whether exceptions to
general rules are warranted"-a context less favorable to those interest
groups.
Id. (citations omitted).
212 Metzger, supra note 39, at 1464.
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sought by the government corporate structure. While corporate managers
must be held accountable, there also exists a need to grant flexibility for
manager decision making. Despite the best attempts to insulate the Trust
Fund, Congress could require regular mandatory hearings in order to
pressure managers to make politically motivated investments. While any
regime governing an FGC should include principles of corporate law, such
law should be strengthened, through the enabling legislation, in order to
ensure accountability. Yet while a modified corporate regime may ensure
political accountability, the need to prevent political influence on the
investment process may require a constitutional amendment mandating
that the Trust Fund be free from such influence.
A. Shareholder Voting Rights
Shareholders theoretically control management by exercising voting rights
to appoint directors 13 and for major events, such as dissolution, merger,
the sale of substantially all of the assets, amendment of the articles of
incorporation, and anything else specified in the articles."1 4 The degree to
which shareholder voting is effective has been the subject of many articles
for both legal and economic academics."' 5 Voting to appoint new directors
is, at best, an inefficient mechanism. Removal of a director through
a shareholder vote must occur at a shareholder meeting.1 6 Although
corporations must hold an annual meeting,"1 7 special meetings require a
call either by the board of directors or at least 10% of the shares of the
corporation."' A court order may also convene a meeting. 19
Weak voting rights benefit the corporation by giving managers the
latitude they need to make business decisions without convening all of
the shareholders for a vote. Although the shareholders are provisionally the
owners of the corporation, control is ceded to the managers for the sake of
efficiency. The argument goes that to the extent a shareholder is dissatisfied
with management, she can sell her shares-voicing dissent through the
sale. If the sale is a large one or enough shareholders dissent by selling,
then the share price of the firm will likely fall, thus sending a signal to the
market that the firm's managers are inefficient. If the corporation's business
has value, then a more efficient corporation will purchase the company and
remove the inefficiency. This market control is discussed in more detail
in the next section. If there is no market for the stock-as is often the
213 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (2004).
214 Id. §§ 2.02, 10.03, 11.04, 12.02, 14.02.
215 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 585.
2V6 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.o8(d).
217 Id. § 7.01.
218 Id. § 7.02.
219 Id. § 7.03.
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case with closely held corporations-then shareholders can seek greater
control of managers through the proxy process or by amending the articles
of incorporation.
In a privatized Trust Fund, the government should be the sole
shareholder and therefore would hold all voting rights.2 0 When the federal
government is the shareholder, there is usually no longer the ability (or
desirability) to sell its stock in the event of inefficient managers. The whole
point of the government holding the stock in an FGC is political rather than
economic."' So, while the government has an interest in maximizing the
wealth of the Trust Fund, the creation of the corporation and the holding
of stock by the government are done for reasons of political insulation.
If the shareholder of a corporation is the one to reap either the literal or
figurative dividends (i.e. the returns on investment), then the government
shareholder of a federal corporation is in the odd position of not being the
one for whom the dividends should flow. It is the workers who paid into
Social Security through the payroll tax who reap the figurative dividend-
not the government. So, if contributors to Social Security rather than the
government shareholder reap the economic benefit of the corporation,
should the contributors, rather than the government shareholder, also have
the shareholder vote? Yet, it would be neither practical nor in all likelihood
constitutional for a national shareholder vote by taxpayers on corporate
matters.
2 2 2
In the absence of a provision in the enabling legislation, a dilemma
develops in who should vote the shares-should it be the President or
an act of Congress?223 "In the absence of legislation, the President, or his
delegate, is presumably the nation's proxy-holder" for voting shares in an
FGC.2 2 4 However, conceptually, shares in a corporation have both voting
rights and economic rights that can be separated and the voting rights can
then be delegated to another party.225 The voting rights can, within certain
constraints, be the subject of private contract so that the voting rights are
220 In some FGCs there is a mixture of both government and private shareholders.
Froomkin, supra note 15, at 554-55. It does not seem likely (in terms of political hurdles)
that the Trust Fund would ever be jointly owned by the government and a private entity.
However, such joint ownership might be an innovative way to solve the funding crisis. A
private co-owner of the Trust Fund would be more profit-motivated and could drive returns
higher, given the profit incentive. In order to be politically viable, such a private co-owner
would need to offer guarantees if investment decisions went sour.
221 Id. at 586.
222 See supra Part II for a discussion of citizen voting for the appointment of directors.
223 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 590.
224 Id.
225 At the common law, courts disfavored the separation of the economic interest from
the voting interest, holding that it was against public policy. Modern statutes allow such
arrangements. J.G. Deutsch, The Teaching of Corporate Law: A Socratic Investigation of Law and
Bureaucracy, 97 YALE L.J. 96, 99-1o0 (1987).
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exercised by proxy, voting trusts or vote pooling agreements.12 6 However,
the nature of the shareholder vote may dictate who exercises the proxy. If
the directors of the Trust Fund are officers of the executive branch, then
the President can vote the shares only with the advice and consent of
the Senate in order to comport with the Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 227 If Congress votes the shares, then it must comply with the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.1 8 Congress
could be deemed the holder of the right to vote shares on non-appointment
issues if a bill authorizing a particular vote on the shares passes successfully
through the legislative process.
Related to shareholder rights, the mechanism of contractual regimes
is often used in corporate law to ensure compliance by managers and
directors. Here, the Trust Fund would be contractually bound to prevent
misdealing. Contractual mechanisms such as this are useful for policing the
government's delegation to purely private entities.2 9 One could certainly
bind the corporation and its officers and directors to contracts which
would specify certain duties. Such a contract would provide a ready basis
for bringing a lawsuit for breach. Breach of contract is typically easier to
prove in court than a breach of a fiduciary duty. However, such contractual
duties are likely to inhibit rather than compel investment managers to take
necessary investment risks. That said, contracts could be used to incentivize
managers to behave in the best interests of the fund by delineating
performance-based compensation. The idea of aligning manager interests
with the interest of the Trust Fund is explored in more detail below.
B. Market Controls
Efficient market theorists suggest that corporate governance is aided by
an efficient market since incompetent managers are displaced by hostile
takeovers. 30 This mechanism of control relies on the assumptions of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which asserts that the
American capital markets are efficient and the price of a security always
reflects all public information. 3 1 The market price of a firm reflects the
performance of an under-performing manager or a manager who shirks
their duties. Simply put, the value of the firm is less because the managers
226 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 7.22, 7.30, 7.31 (2004).
227 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
228 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 590.
229 See Freeman, supra note 55, at 606.
230 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target' Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. i61, 1169-70(1981).
231 See generally Christopher Paul Saari, The Efficent Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
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are not performing optimally. Yet, the cost of replacing the incompetent
manager through derivative suits is high.
ECMH theorists argue that hostile takeovers act as a check against
incompetent managers. In the hostile takeover, a competitor has the ability to
evaluate the potential value of the firm without the incompetent managers.
The bidder typically runs up the price of shares by offering to purchase
all or a controlling interest in the firm. If successful, the incompetent
managers are fired and the new owners run the firm more profitably. Under
this theory, corporate governance regimes should allow hostile takeovers
as a check against incompetent managers. 32 ECMH was well accepted
by economists, politicians and legal scholars during the 1970s and 1980s;
however, the evolution of economic theory as well as empirical studies in
behavioral finance suggests that the markets are not efficient. 33 Regardless
of whether markets are efficient, market controls are not meaningful in the
case of an FGC since the acquisition of the Trust Fund by a private entity
would make Trust Fund assets vulnerable to a third party's misuse and
therefore should be prohibited by the enabling legislation. As unlikely as
a merger might seem, the enabling legislation should specifically prohibit,
without an act of Congress, the possibility of any merger.
Although the market control of a takeover should be pre-empted
legislatively, other market controls might be mandated by the legislation.
One way in which the market regulates is through a variety of ingenious
"early warning mechanisms" which might "signal Congress that a particular
[corporation] is in financial trouble." 34 For instance, if a company's stock
is publicly traded on a stock exchange then the pricing of the cumulative
assessment of all buyers and analysts of a stock help inform the public
on the company's prospects.3" If there are enough buyers and sellers in
a market then the price of the trade becomes the equivalent of a national
election in which the question of whether a firm is solvent is put on the
agenda.
36
232 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23o , at 1169-74.
233 Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,
28 J. CORP. L. 635, 636-38 (2003). Professor Stout explores recent finance literature and
suggests that "ECMH simplifies a complex reality." Stout suggests that ECMH is inadequate
to explain the markets since (i) investors have heterogeneous expectations, (2) information
does not move into the share price as quickly as first thought and (3) behavioral finance studies
illustrate that not all actors in the market have "rational expectations." Id. at 638.
234 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 621. Professor Froomkin analyzes market mechanisms
as they apply to government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), a special breed of FGC which are
"limited by Congress to lending to a particular constituency (farmers, students, homeowners),
or for a particular purpose (such as recapitalizing insolvent savings and loans)." Id. at 555-56.
The Social Security Trust Fund corporation could be considered a species that falls into the
later category since its specific purpose is to provide for funding Social Security.
235 Id. at 62 1.
236 One might accomplish this by having the Trust Fund issue a non-voting, tracking
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The problem with the pricing of an FGC stock on a public exchange
is that such an entity carries with it an "implicit federal guarantee" on
the corporation's debt 3 7 and therefore a true reflective price is illusory.
However, proposals have been made to "pay rating agencies, such as
Standard & Poor's (who are presumably experts at assessing financial risk)
to issue regular credit ratings ... on the assumption that no federal rescue is
available. '2 3 8 While a mandated rating by an independent agency will help
in providing an early warning system to financial insolvency, the signal by
itself will not be enough to police the corporate entity. Another innovative
suggestion to put market controls on FGCs would be to create competing
federally owned companies with "identical powers and missions."3 9
While economies of scale might be lost,2 4° such competition might lead to
efficiencies and higher returns on investment.
If shareholder voting and market controls are an inadequate means
of policing the corporation, then recourse to the courts and government
oversight must fill in the gap.
C. Judicial Remedies
Litigation or the threat of litigation for a breach of a fiduciary duty or ultra
vires acts is both a popular and controversial method for keeping directors
and officers in check.14 In corporate law, the shareholder derivative lawsuit
is the corporation's "judicial remedy for mismanagement or other wrongful
acts of directors, officers, or third parties." "42 Commentators suggest
that shareholder litigation is ineffective as an accountability mechanism
because of judicial deference to managers and directors. 43 However, recent
decisions suggest a trend towards holding directors more culpable for acts
of mismanagement if they ignore their duty of good faith.2"
Whether or not litigation is an effective deterrent to officer and director
mismanagement will in large part be controlled by the complex issues of
stock that reflects the performance of the fund. Issuing the track stock would also be another
way to raise money for the Fund, and would serve as an alternative investment choice to
mutual funds for workers who want to build their retirement savings.
237 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 621.
238 Id. at 622.
239 Id. at 628.
240 Id.
241 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15-01.
242 Id. § 15.03.
243 See Jones, supra note 2io, at io8.
244 Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors:
The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 213 (2006) (arguing
that a more vigorous duty of good faith has emerged recently in Delaware corporate law,




justiciability of claims against the government. Some of the issues raised
when judicial remedies are sought against an FGC include: (1) whether the
status of the FGC as a state actor confers sovereign immunity, (2) who has
standing to bring a suit and (3) the causes of action that will lead to a suit.
1. Sovereign Immunity.-The U.S. federal government is immune from
lawsuits under the well-established doctrine of sovereign immunity
45
unless, of course, the government waives its immunity and consents to the
lawsuit. Notable situations where the government has waived immunity
include the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 46 and the Tucker Act for
contract claims. 47 If the FGC is deemed to be a state actor, then it should
logically follow that the entity would likewise be immune from suit
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity subject to the well-established
exceptions.1
41
Sovereign immunity for an FGC could be precluded merely by
designating the corporation as a private actor which can sue and be sued
for such purposes in the enabling legislation.149 However, without such a
disclaimer, a privatized Trust Fund could be thrown into an anomalous
role where the FGC can claim sovereign immunity as an instrumentality
of the federal government but still be excluded from the FTCA which
provides a limited waiver of such immunity for some torts committed
by employees of federal agencies. Professor Froomkin highlighted this
"peculiar result" by tracking decisions concerning the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), an FGC providing home loans.
50
Federal courts have held that the Merrill Doctrine, which precludes
estoppel arguments from being used against federal agencies, also applies
to Freddie Mac because of that organization's public purpose. 5 ' However,
those same federal agencies that are protected by the Merrill Doctrine
waive their sovereign immunity under the FTCA. Yet, courts held that
245 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends").
246 z8 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2ooo) (allowing a lawsuit for tort damages against the United
States if "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant").
247 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000) (allowing a party to sue the government for damages in a
breach of contract lawsuit).
248 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 594.
249 See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (i995) (holding that
a disclaimer in the enabling legislation could exempt an FGC from sovereign immunity
status).
25o Froomkin, supra note i5, at 591-94.
251 Id. at 593.
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Freddie Mac, while enjoying sovereign immunity, was not subject to
the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity since it was not an agency of
the United States government.'-" The result is that an FGC might "have





Aside from tort claims, there is judicial review of federal agency actions
(and government corporations designated as federal agencies) through the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).M4 Such review consists of challenges
to agency actions giving standing for mandatory or injunctive relief to a
person "suffering legal wrong because of agency action."s' The grounds
for bringing such actions are similar to the standard used if the entity was
a business-i.e. "an abuse of 'business judgment' or a failure to fulfill the
imposed duties or perform the required functions" of the entity.15 6 For
FGCs not designated as federal agencies, there is no comparable statutory
right. While the enabling legislation of FGCs typically allow the entity to
sue and be sUed, federal courts may exercise their judicial discretion to
bar suits against FGCs since "judicial policy limitations effectively operate
to bar the use of federal courts as a forum for the airing of generalized
grievances about the conduct of the government."
57
If the privatized Trust Fund is designated as a state actor in the enabling
legislation, as was suggested above in order to comport with constitutional
requirements, and is also deemed to be entitled to sovereign immunity,
then the enabling legislation should provide situations where sovereign
immunity is waived. Courts have held that when the powers provision of
a national corporation's charter includes the power to "sue or be sued in
courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the
United States" then sovereign immunity is waived."' Such language by
Congress would give federal courts original jurisdiction over any disputes
to which the Trust Fund was a party 5 9 and so should be part of the enabling
legislation. In order to prevent abuse of process, the enabling legislation
may prohibit state court actions altogether and require that any suit be
brought in federal court1 60 It may be that some limited sovereign immunity
is called for in order to preclude opportunistic plaintiffs' lawyers, but at the
same time, there should be carve-outs to reign in the officers and directors
252 Id. at 592.
253 Id. at 594-
254 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76, 70i-o6 (2000).
255 5 U.S.C. § 702.
256 Diane Hobbs, Note, Personal Liability of Directors of Federal Government Corporations,
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 733, 770 (1980).
257 Id. at 768.
258 Barton v. Am. Red Cross, 826 F. Supp. 412,414 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
259 Gonzales v. Commonwealth, 726 F Supp. 1o, 12 (D.P.R. 1989).
26o City of Middlesboro v. Ky. Utils. Co., 146 S.W2d 48,52 (Ky. 1940).
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who engage in malfeasance or nonfeasance. The derivative suit is one such
carve-out.
2. Judicial and Statutory Determination of Standing.-The derivative suit
is a cause of action brought as a "representative suit on behalf of the
corporation."' 61 The derivative suit stands in contrast to an individual
lawsuit against a corporation where the plaintiff asserts that the corporation
has harmed the plaintiff by a tort, violation of the law or breach of contract.
In a derivative suit, the plaintiff asserts that a director or officer has harmed
the corporation and seeks relief for the corporation from the director or
officer personally. In the context of FGCs, scholars have commented that
holding directors personally liable will encourage accountability since other
enforcement means "do not seem to be uniformly effective."2 62
A plaintiff in a derivative suit has standing to bring the action to court
only if she is a shareholder;2 63 consequently, in the context of an FGC owned
wholly by the government only the government would theoretically be
able to bring a derivative suit against the Trust Fund. Yet, the government
as shareholder is not the direct beneficiary of the investments made by the
Trust Fund-it is the taxpayers who have paid into Social Security who
will reap the rewards of the corporation's investments. A question arises
over whether the government should even have the ability to sue the Trust
Fund given that the goal is to eliminate political influences over the Trust
Fund. A politically motivated lawsuit by the Attorney General could inhibit
the freedom of the directors and officers to make investment decisions that
maximize the wealth of the Trust Fund.
If wealth maximization is the primary purpose of the Trust Fund (as this
paper argues that it should be) then it is the taxpayers who have a direct
interest in holding directors and officers accountable for mismanagement,
malfeasance and nonfeasance since they have more to lose. Instead of a
derivative suit, such a plaintiff might bring a citizen or taxpayer lawsuit
against the FGC, as an agency of the government, alleging that the officers
and directors have violated a law or constitutional right, breached a duty,
or caused harm to the plaintiffs. In this context, the lawsuit is akin to the
corporate derivative suit in that the taxpayer is asserting a "public right"
rather than a "private right." 64 In other words, the individual is bringing a
suit on behalf of the general good rather than for specific redress.
In such cases, the constitutional issues surrounding standing limit
taxpayer ability to bring lawsuits. Limitations on lawsuits, whether against
corporations or the government, are an attempt to reduce needless costs
and frivolous claims. Lawsuits are, of course, costly and "plaintiffs initiate
z6i Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15.03.
262 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 779.
263 MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar §§ 7.40, 7.41 (2004).
264 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 771.
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representative actions in a somewhat fortuitous manner." '65 Moreover,
courts may want to limit the burden put on the judiciary and, as a policy
matter, limit "judicial intrusion into agency action." 66 However, given the
need to protect the assets of the taxpayer beneficiary, some rights to bring
derivative suits should be specified in the enabling legislation to grant
standing to a class of individuals to the extent that it is constitutional to
do so.
Standing is a judicially created limitation on the ability of a litigant to
bring a case to court. The U.S. Supreme Court has established that in order
for a party to bring a case or controversy in federal court, the party must
establish Constitutional Article III requirements of an injury in fact,
67
causation 68 and redressability1
69
Even if Article III requirements are satisfied, courts may refuse standing
based on "prudential principles."7 0 "[U]nder the prudential principles...
the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where
no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." '' To the
extent that the lawsuit alleges a violation of federal law, "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."2 2
In addition, the claim must be isolated to an identifiable group. The
courts have been reluctant to grant standing for matters that amounted to a
"generalized injury to the public."273 Often called citizen suits, the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected allowing standing for a "generalized
grievance" where "the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated
and 'common to all members of the public.' 2 7 4 The rationale is that
in matters where the public at large is affected, the role of oversight of
265 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15.01.
266 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 769.
267 Gladstone Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979) ("[Pllaintiff must show
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant").
z68 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]here must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly
. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court"').
269 Id. at 56t ("[Ilt must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury
will be 'redressed by a favorable decision').
270 Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99-1on.
271 Id.
272 Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,488 (1998)
(quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
273 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 771.




a government agency or an FGC is that of Congress and the Executive
branch. 75 Commentators suggest that the political process rather than the
courts should monitor FGCs. 7 6 However, that brings up the thorny issue
of political influence in the investment decision.
In the context of the Trust Fund, if a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs
were to plead a valid breach of fiduciary cause of action (as discussed
below), then the Article III standing requirements might be satisfied if the
evidence shows a direct injury. To prove injury in fact, "the plaintiff must
have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent,' not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 77 The types of injuries that have met this
requirement include both economic harm 78 and non-economic harm. 79
Non-economic harm injuries have successfully satisfied the injury in fact
requirement in suits against FGCs.8 0 Any likely lawsuit by taxpayers would
be the result of mismanagement of the assets of the Trust Fund which
resulted in a reduction of the value. The direct harm would be either the
probability of a reduction of benefits or an increase in taxes on taxpayers
because of the mismanagement. Economists and actuaries would need to
establish the effect that the mismanagement would have on funding Social
Security benefits in order to eliminate the conjectural or hypothetical
nature of the harm.
Since Social Security contributions are part of the FICA tax, such claims
are likely to be scrutinized using the precedent for taxpayer lawsuits. In
these suits, taxpayers assert that some action of an agency has resulted
in a misuse of funds that affected the taxpayer's interest. To the extent
that such suits assert protection of the interests of the public at large,
the courts have consistently rejected taxpayer standing. 8' The Supreme
275 Id. at 576 ("'The province of the court,' as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury
v. Madison, 'is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.' Vindicating the public interest
(including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive").
276 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 773.
277 Lujan, 5o4 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
278 Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 E3d 895, 901
(zooo) ("[Elconomic loss from a defendant's conduct can give rise to constitutional standing,
even when that loss would not itself give rise to prudential standing to assert a cause of action
against the defendant").
279 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183
(2000) ("[Einvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they
use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the
area will be lessened' by the challenged activity").
z8o Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (allowing
environmental groups to sue two wholly owned FGCs, the Overseas Private Investment
Corp. and the Export-Import Bank, for violating the National Environmental Policy Act by
investing in foreign energy projects that contributed global warming).
281 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2563 (2007).
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Court has ruled that "a taxpayer has standing to challenge the collection
of a specific tax assessment as unconstitutional." ' But the court rejects
the notion that taxpayers have "a continuing, legally cognizable interest"
in taxes that have been "lawfully collected." '83 The Court reasons that
"'[i]nterest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared with millions of
others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers
of a court of equity."' 84
The Social Security tax is somewhat different than other forms of
taxation in that FICA is levied as a separate accounting entry from income
tax deductions and the moneys paid in can be traced to the operations and
assets of the SSA. Moreover, not all of the "public at large" are covered by
Social Security though the SSA estimates that 162 million workers paid into
the system in 2006.85 Even so, the courts are likely to follow the generally
accepted policies that the court should not interfere into the management
of other agencies.
Given that courts are reluctant to grant standing in taxpayer suits and
the burden is high to prove injury in fact, an alternative needs to develop
if beneficiaries of the Trust Fund are to be given the right to sue. One
solution is to grant the right of standing to contributors in the enabling
legislation. However, Congress may not weaken the standing requirements
by legislating that a party has standing when no injury in fact has occurred
as a result of the agency action. 8 6 To do so would grant to Congress the
ability to limit the oversight power of the administrative executive in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 87
If public law is inadequate to address the need to give Trust Fund
beneficiaries a judicial remedy, then perhaps corporate law offers an
alternative. While corporate law does not allow plaintiffs who are not
shareholders to bring a derivative suit, one might consider giving each
contributor to Social Security a limited equity interest in the privatized
Trust Fund. "Some FGCs are wholly or partly owned by persons whom
the FGCs were designed to benefit. Vesting ownership in the targeted
beneficiaries has the advantage of greatly increasing the chance that any
profits ... will go to those groups.""88 The status as shareholders would then
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)).
285 THE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No.
I IO-3o, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR0TRo7/tro7.pdf.
286 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
287 Id. at 577.
288 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 586.
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give the beneficiaries standing to bring a derivative suit; however, such a
structure becomes problematic since the beneficiary owners then develop
an interest in retaining control of the corporation. 8 9
To address this problem, each Social Security beneficiary could be
given a special class of non-voting, non-transferable corporate stock
for the purpose of creating a beneficial interest which gives rise to the
standing requirements. The non-voting status would avoid dealing
with administrative and constitutional issues surrounding voting for the
appointment of directors, such as those discussed in Part III. Such an
equity interest would increase as the taxpayer paid into the system. Given
the non-transferability, their interest could never be sold or mortgaged
and would revert to the FGC upon the death of the taxpayer. Tracking a
contributor's beneficial interest is not likely to add any significant additional
administrative cost since contributions are already tracked by the SSA and
sent to taxpayers automatically starting at the age of twenty-five years. 90
Adopting such a structure, however, may still lead to overzealous
plaintiff lawyers filing nuisance suits. One possible solution would be to
designate within the enabling legislation an organization who would act as
the plaintiff working on behalf of the beneficiaries in a corporate derivative
suit. This solution finds some support in the doctrine surrounding non-
profit corporate law. There are parallels betwcen the typical public benefit
nonprofit corporation and a Trust Fund operating as an FGC. The corporate
structure of a public benefit nonprofit corporation typically has voting
members who elect the board of directors. However, the beneficiaries of
a public benefit nonprofit corporation, for whom the charity was created,
typically have no voting rights or control over the corporation. In the same
way contributors to Social Security would have no voting rights in an FGC
based Trust Fund.
Given these similarities, an examination of derivative lawsuits against
the directors of a nonprofit corporation may help in understanding how
to hold a privatized Trust Fund accountable. In the nonprofit context,
the equivalent of a derivative lawsuit is usually brought by the statutory
members of the nonprofit corporation or directors and officers."' 1 Members
who can bring suits are typically only those members who have voting
rights and not those who are members in name only. Moreover, donators
and supporters of a charity who do not have voting rights typically do not
have standing.
Both profit and nonprofit corporations are also subject to examination
by the attorney general who has standing to bring a suit.9 ' Likewise, by
289 Id.
290 See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR STATEMENT, http://www.ssa.gov/
mystatement/ (follow "What is the Statement?" hyperlink) (last visited July 9, 2007).
291 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142, 7142, 9142 (West 2007).
292 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250.
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the statute forming the corporation, the Attorney General of the United
States should be empowered to bring a suit against the Trust Fund in much
the same way that a shareholder would bring a derivative suit. However,
this delineation of power should be seen as expansive rather than limiting.
The Attorney General would, of course, be able to bring any criminal
proceedings which might be warranted against the corporation or its officers
and directors. In fact, one method to ensure that managers and directors
do not breach the public trust would be to have heightened sentencing
guidelines for any misuse of public funds by directors and officers.
One concept sometimes used to give standing to third parties is the
relator who sues on behalf of another party. In nonprofit corporation law,
some jurisdictions allow the Attorney General to grant "relator status" to
a party to bring actions that the Attorney General would normally bring. 93
Using the doctrine ofparenspatriae, the state generally acts on behalf of its
citizens who cannot protect themselves, but the state also has the power to
grant to another person-the relator-to be a party in interest who takes
on the role of the plaintiff in the suit."9 Likewise, the enabling legislation
could specify a separate party in interest who is authorized to bring suit
on behalf of the beneficiaries. That party, would in effect, become a third-
party watchdog organization. Likely candidates might be the National
Academy of Social Insurance, American Association of Retired Persons
95
or an organization consisting of financial professionals who would be best
able to make a determination if investments were not well diversified
and optimized to meet the purpose of the organization-i.e. wealth
maximization. Perhaps a watchdog group could be formed comprised of
representatives from the various stock exchanges, commodity exchanges,
venture capital community, and real estate investment professionals. Like
the board of directors or trustees, such a relator should be politically neutral
or at least be composed of members of each party so that political concerns
in bringing lawsuits are neutralized.
The relator status would not confer any personal interest in the entity on
the assets of the trust. Rather, any remedy sought by the suit would probably
be an equitable injunction to compel the corporation to act or refrain from
293 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142(a)(5), 7142(a)(5).
294 Brown v. Mem'l Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d I 18, I62 Cal. App. 2d 513,536-39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958).
295 AARP is a powerful lobbying group representing people over the age of 50. AARP
adamantly opposed the Republican private accounts proposal. See Marie F. Smith, President,
Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons, The Future of Social Security (July 18, 2005), http://www.aarp.
org/research/international/speeches/jul18_o5_mariesmithremarks.html. The problem with
designating the AARP as a relator is that the organization is viewed as a political lobbying
organization with its own agenda. See JAMEs L. MARTIN, AARP: ASSOCIATION AGAINST RETIRED
PERSONS, http://www.6oplus.org/about-aarp.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). The 60 Plus
Association advocates for private accounts as the best reform for social security. See SOCIAL
SECURITY HERE TO STAY (June 1, 2005), http://www.6oplus.org/news.asp?doclD=454.
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acting, restitution by the officers or directors if there has been self-dealing
or a constructive trust over some of the assets of the corporation. Damages
to the relator would not be contemplated though surely some provision
must be made for attorneys fees in order to prevent the deterrent effect
of bringing lawsuits-i.e. the cost-to inhibit the relator from bringing an
otherwise worthy lawsuit.
Another related idea would be to provide for a qui tam29 6 action which
allows an individual to bring an action on behalf of the government. The
False Claims Act confers standing on an individual to bring a suit in the
name of the government to recover the misappropriation of government
funds by government contractors and employees. 2 97 Such a whistleblower
suit might be useful in policing any subcontractors that the Trust Fund
uses to invest Social Security revenues. If the Trust Fund is deemed a
state actor, it may be subject to qui tam suits unless the enabling legislation
specifically exempts the Trust Fund from the False Claims Act. Qui tam
suits allow the individual who brings the suit to share in the recovery of
damages-sometimes as much as 30% of the recovery but no less 15%.9 8
Considering the amount of money likely to be involved, such a potential
recovery will motivate less scrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys to file suits
regardless of the merit. While Social Security funds should not be diverted
to plaintiffs' lawyers' pockets, whistleblowers should be encouraged to
come forward with information of misappropriation of funds. Any potential
qui tam suit which is authorized under the enabling legislation should be
limited in the amount of recovery to avoid disproportionate awards.
The principal advantage of the relator lawsuit outlined above is that
a board of investment professionals will make the decision as to whether
the Trust Fund has breached its fiduciary duty. Yet that strength is also
a weakness. In the clubby atmosphere of finance, it is possible the
watchdog group and the Trust Fund will be so intertwined professionally
that meaningful checks in the system could be overlooked in the name of
relationships. Qui tam suits, on the other hand, may provide an additional
check though the recovery should be strictly limited so as to avoid
opportunistic and costly litigation. Finally, the Attorney General must have
the ability to monitor the Trust Fund as well as other agencies as discussed
below.
One likely issue to come up for managers and directors is the extent
to which they will be indemnified in lawsuits. Corporate law provides that
the articles of incorporation may indemnify directors and officers to limit or
eliminate liability for legal fees and judgments provided that they have not
296 The term Qui tam is based on the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hacparte sequitur" which translates into "who as well for the king as for himself sues in
this matter." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
297 31 U.S.C. § 373o(b) (2000).
298 31 U.S.C. § 373o(d).
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breached a fiduciary duty, committed a crime or intentionally caused harm
to the corporation.2 99 In some circumstances, a corporation must indemnify
directors and officers if they are "wholly successful, on the merits" of a
lawsuit.3°° Since lawsuits are inevitable, indemnification of officers and
directors will have to be provided for in the enabling legislation. Otherwise,
the Fund will be unable to attract suitable candidates for the position for
fear of being personally liable in a lawsuit.
The reality is that a privatized Trust Fund will sometimes be operating
as a government entity and sometimes operating more like a private sector
entity, such as a hedge fund. Therefore, ascribing one single path to judicial
remedies may be "ill-advised" for FGCs.3 °' The path to judicial redress
should certainly allow private actions in the form of breach of contract and
tort claims, derivative actions via a beneficiary representative for breach
of fiduciary duties, criminal charges through the office of the Attorney
General and constitutional challenges where there has been an injury in
fact. One way to make judicial challenges efficient will be to clearly set out
the fiduciary duties under which a derivative action would be brought.
3. Causes of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duties.-A set of common law and
statutory rules have evolved which state that officers and directors owe
shareholders a set of fiduciary duties-principally the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty, though some courts also speak to a duty of obedience.
Breach of a duty gives rise to a derivative suit brought by a shareholder on
behalf of the corporation. However, in the context of an FGC, the duties
owed by the directors are uncertain.30 1 Should presidentially appointed
directors have duties not only to the shareholders and corporation but also
to the broader national interest?33 This article first discusses the traditional
duties of care and loyalty that officers and directors owe the corporation
and its shareholders and addresses the question of whether those duties
should be heightened by including an explicit duty of good faith as the
basis of a cause of action. Second, the article examines how trust law and
non-profit corporate law help heighten the fiduciary duties of directors
and officers. In particular, the article discusses duties of the directors and
officers in relationship to making decisions to maximize the wealth of the
Trust in order to avoid political influence. Finally, the article reviews the
literature on whether directors and officers of an FGC owe a duty to the
national interest.
299 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.o2(b)(4)-(5) (2004).
300 Id. § 8.52.
301 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 778.
302 Froomkin, supra note i5, at 587.
303 Id. at 588.
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There are few precedents within federal law to define the duties of an
FGC's officers and directors. 3" The Securities Acts might provide some
guidance. FGCs are not reporting companies, so the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 doesn't apply and there is no federal corporations' code and
little in the way of federal common law.3"5 In fashioning federal common
law, the courts might draw upon state corporate law.3°6 Delaware has
the most highly developed set of cases regarding the fiduciary duties of
managers and directors and provides the best starting point for discussion
of the standards. The two most often-cited duties of directors and officers
of private corporations are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
307
The duty of care operates to ensure that directors and management
operate in good faith as "ordinarily prudent persons managing their own
affairs" and use decision making that "best advances the interests of the
corporation.3 0 8 The duty of care is limited by the business judgment rule
where if the decision is the result of an informed judgment then a rebuttable
presumption exists that the officers or director did not breach the duty of
care.3°9 Some scholars contend that the classic duty of care "no longer exists
in Delaware" as a device to hold managers accountable. 310 Directors can
make a decision that ends badly for the corporation merely by conducting
a "ritualistic consideration of the relevant data. ' 311 For purposes of an FGC,
a standard for fiduciary duties that is higher than that found in corporate
law is advisable.
312
The duty of care is enhanced by and intertwined with the duty of
loyalty so that the ordinarily prudent director does not act in his own
self-interest."3 The duty of loyalty prevents directors and management
from profiting at the expense of the corporation unless the self-interested
party shows "entire fairness" which consists of both fair dealing and fair
price.314 Ratification of the self-interested transaction by a majority of
the disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders satisfies the
304 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 587.
305 Id.
306 Id. at n.224.
307 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 244, at 219. Granted there are many other duties
cited in corporate law including the duty of good faith, duty to investigate, duty to inform
and duty of obedience, among others, but the duty of care and duty of loyalty are typically
the duties which give rise to a cause of action. The other duties are normally subsumed under
these two broader concepts.
308 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 n.402 (Del. Ch. 2005).
309 Id. at 746-47.
3 10 Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589,
591 (2oo6).
311 Id.
312 Hobbs, supra note 256, at 779.
313 In re Walt Disney, 907 A.zd at 745-746.
314 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
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defendant's burden to prove fairness, though some states provide that even
if there is ratification, judicial relief will be granted if a plaintiff shows that
the transaction was not fair.31
The duty of loyalty deserves special attention given the nature of the
privatized trust fund as an entity with the principal purpose of engaging
in investments. The potential for abuse by the sophisticated investors
running the fund is high. Officers and directors would naturally be
statutorily subject under the enabling legislation to a duty of loyalty as
least as strong as that found in for-profit corporate law. The duty of loyalty
is meant to prevent self-dealing transactions, yet such transactions are
typically sanctioned if a majority of the disinterested directors ratify the
transaction. 316 That duty of loyalty might be symbolically, as well as legally,
enforced if the legislation requires that both the board and officers of the
Trust be mandated to take an oath of office.317 Since the Trust Fund, even
though it is a private corporation, would still be a state actor, then such an
oath would be consistent with that taken by heads of agencies.
The application of the duty of loyalty has a peculiar application in the
context of an investment trust fund. One application of the duty of loyalty
is the corporate opportunity doctrine-i.e. that management will not usurp
opportunities of the corporation for their own benefit. 3 8 So, in the case of
an investment trust, one might fashion a rule which prevents the manager
from investing in the same stock as that of the fund. If allowed to do so,
he could engage in "front-running"-the practice of purchasing stocks for
one's own account before the fund purchases the stock thus driving up
the price. The enabling legislation should restrict what stocks investment
advisors can purchase for their own accounts since the Trust Fund is likely
to move markets.
However, such a rule could backfire. If investment advisors cannot
purchase for their own accounts, will they then bypass some opportunities
that the Trust Fund should invest in so that they can reap the gains of
the investment in their own accounts? Any rule should attempt to align
the interests of management with the interests of the beneficiaries of the
corporation. While the legislation should prevent managers from front-
running, managers should be required to keep a large portion of their wealth
in a shadow fund that mimics the Trust Fund. The Yale Trust addresses the
agency problem by requiring that its managers invest a significant amount
315 Id. at 1117 ("[A]n approval of the [interested] transaction by an independent com-
mittee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof
on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging
shareholder-plaintiff").
316 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § O.I I.
317 The board of governors of the Federal Reserve must take an oath of office. 12 U.S.C.
§ 242 (2000).
318 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 10. 11.
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of their own wealth in the same investments as Yale.3 19 By doing so, they
align the interests of the managers and the Yale Fund to avoid a breach of
fiduciary duty in any given investment. Consequently, in an odd twist, it
would result in more loyalty if the managers were required to invest side
by side with the Trust Fund rather than being prevented from investing in
stocks that will move markets.
Current standards surrounding the duties of care and loyalty may not be
enough to ensure the prohibition of all director and officer misconduct.3"'
The current corporate law conception of the breach of the duty of care allows
too much latitude in the decision making of directors to be an effective
standard to govern the directors of a privatized Social Security Trust Fund.
In creating standards to address issues of agency, the enabling legislation
for the Social Security Trust Fund needs to go beyond for-profit corporate
law to create higher standards for fiduciary duties. Given the unique nature
of the entity, a higher standard approaching that of a trustee is necessary.
Probably the most quoted standard for a fiduciary's duty comes from Justice
Benjamin Cardozo: "[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.""3 While current court
decisions regarding for-profit corporate director duty do not likely reach
the standard that Cardozo articulated, some trends are encouraging.
In the wake of highly publicized cases of director mismanagement, the
Delaware courts have struggled with whether the duty of good faith gives
rise to a separate cause of action.32 Although many scholars maintain that
there should be a heightened duty of good faith,32 3 recent decisions resolve
that a breach of the duty of good faith does not give rise to a separate
cause of action though breaches of the duty of good faith are a precondition
of the breach of the duty of care.3 4 For purposes of the privatized Social
Security Trust Fund, the duty of good faith should stand as an independent
cause of action along the duties of care and loyalty. Historically, the duty of
good faith has been articulated in both statutes and case law.35 Allowing
319 YALE CoRP. IN v. COMM., THE YALE ENDOWMENT: 2oo6, at 6 (2006), available at http://
www.yale.edu/investments/YaleEndowment.o6.pdf.
320 Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5
(2oo6).
321 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,464 (1928).
322 Gordon Smith, Rememberthe "Triads of Fiduciary Duty "? Just Kidding!, CONGLOMERATE,
Nov. 7, 2oo6, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2oo6/i i/remember__the_tr.html.
323 Eisenberg, supra note 32o, at i. The duty of good faith has been incorporated into
statutes and implied in the common law for a long time as a method by which the other duties
can be explained. Arguing that the duty of good faith should form a separate cause of action
since some conduct which constitutes a breach of the duty falls outside the duties of care and
loyalty. Id.
324 See Smith, Remember the "Triads of Fiduciary Duty"? Just Kidding!, supra note 322.
325 Eisenberg, supra note 32o, at 10-11.
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a breach of the duty of good faith as a separate cause of action would hold
directors and officers accountable for actions where there is no bad faith or
"improper motivation. '  Under present conceptions of the duty of care
and the business judgment rule, corporate directors might not be liable
even for gross negligence.31 7 A stronger conception of good faith would
"hold[] that conscious disregard of duty exposes directors to personal
liability."31 8 In discussing the evolving role of good faith, Professors Duggin
and Goldman noted "[tihis new good faith focuses on 'true faithfulness
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.""'3 9
Raising the importance of good faith as fiduciary duty would bring the
standard closer to the Cardozo's original conception.
In addition to for-profit corporate law, other bodies of law help inform
the legal duties that should be imposed statutorily on the Social Security
Trust Fund to make sure that the managers and directors do not breach their
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries. In addition to the for-profit corporate
law standard already discussed, this article will examine: the law of trusts as
expressed in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and economic theory regarding
risk and return, 331 the duty of obligation under non-profit corporate law and
even standards under ERISA. From a practical point of view, the enabling
legislation will have to explicitly state that the board and management owe
a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries and contributors to Social Security so
that any watchdog group who has standing can enforce that duty through
litigation. Second, the legislation would need to specify what standards
govern that fiduciary duty.
Trust law deals with the agency problem in situations where the trustee,
who has control over the assets, acts in his own self-interest rather than the
interest of the beneficiaries. The privatization of the Social Security Trust
Fund would create yet another altogether unique agency problem. The
Social Security Fund is not a real trust in the usual sense of the term, 331 yet
it carries many of the same characteristics of a conventional trust. While the
Trust Fund under this proposal would be a corporation with a shareholder
(i.e. the U.S. government), the managers of the corporation should be working
for someone altogether different than the shareholder-i.e. the public who
contributes to or receives benefits from the Trust Fund. Consequently, in
an ironic twist, what could be labeled as breach of fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries-e.g. investment in low-return governmental assets-is
actually a benefit to the shareholder-i.e. the federal government.
326 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 244, at 274.
327 Id. at 265.
328 Id. at 273.
329 Id.
330 Weiss, supra note i i, at 1003-1 .




The Prudent Investor Rule as embodied in Restatement (Third) of Trusts
section 227 provides that trustees have a duty to beneficiaries to manage
the funds as a "prudent investor would, in light of the ... circumstances
of the trust." 33 2 The standard of care is a reasonable one that is applied to
the overall investment strategy rather than each individual investment,
333
thus individual investments might be risky so long as the overall portfolio
is diversified. One key feature of the Prudent Investor Rule is that it
mandates a diversified portfolio yet it allows an exception to the rule when
it is prudent not to diversify. By mandating diversification, the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts aligns with modern portfolio theory.3 4 Consequently, a
trust could maximize returns while eliminating risk.
33
1
Yet the exception gives cause for concern. This standard and exception
has been incorporated into ERISA,3 36 where it has "wrought havoc with ...
fiduciary law." '337 Courts have been reluctant to hold fiduciaries responsible
for bad investment decisions so long as there was a good faith belief 338 that
an investment would yield a good return. In part, the problem is that ERISA
provides no explanation of modern portfolio theory, therefore, the courts
do not have any guidance on what diversification means.3 9 The exception
transforms itself into a fundamental flaw in the standard when it comes to
a Social Security Trust Fund portfolio. Commentators would not apply this
exception to diversification for any form of privatized Social Security since
it is "almost impossible to imagine circumstances under which a retirement
account should assume diversifiable risk."'
In discussing the fiduciary standard to be applied to private investment
companies handling personal Social Security accounts, Professor Weiss
proposes a higher fiduciary standard than required by the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts or ERISA. Professor Weiss proposes that "[i]n making and
implementing investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the
investments of the trust so as to eliminate unique or diversifiable risk."-"
The overarching fiduciary duty standard for the Social Security Trust could
still be mandated to be the Restatement (Third) of Trusts since section 227
332 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ThUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).
333 Id.
334 Weiss, supra note I I, at 1004-05.
335 There is some debate as to whether the Restatement standard requires the
elimination of unique risk. The Reporters' comment describes unique risk, but the standard
of section 227 does not explicitly mention unique risk. Id. at Ioo8-O9.
336 Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
337 Weiss, supra note I I, at Ioo6.
338 Id. at 1007 (stating courts find no breach of duty occurs if a good faith effort exists,
even in the face of disastrous results).
339 Id. at ioo6.
340 Id. at 1007.
341 Id. at liob; see also Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 132.
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provides that its standard is modified by the principles of section 228
which in turn provides that the trustees must "conform to any applicable
statutory provisions governing investment by trustees."342 Thus, the Trust
Fund could be ruled by the well-developed body of law surrounding the
Restatement of Trusts as modified by the legislation providing for a higher
standard in terms of diversification.
Non-profit corporate law also helps inform how risks might be minimized
since a privatized Trust Fund has similar characteristic to a public benefit
non-profit corporation. Here, the contributors to Social Security would
be like the beneficiaries of a public benefit non-profit. They would have
no voting rights but in essence gain all of the benefit of the corporation.
Non-profit corporate law theory struggles with the very issue of whether to
apply corporate law or trust law in the matter of breaches of fiduciary duty
when there is no one to oversee the overseers and hold them accountable.
Non-profit law theorists conclude that "corporate law parallelism-the
policy of modeling nonprofit corporate law after for-profit corporate law
-seems to aggravate concerns about mission accountability in charitable
corporations." 3 Yet "trust law as the organizational mechanism for nonprofit
corporations has little to commend it."'
When the issue is addressed for the non-profit charitable corporation,
scholars conclude that issues of accountability of directors and management
are largely "neglected[,] . . . muddled [and] unsettled. 3 4 Non-profit
corporate law in the majority of states apply the same standard used in
for-profit corporations to the non-profit corporation for both the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty,346 which ultimately means that directors
and officers are favored. In addition, however, non-profit law applies a
duty of obligation "to observe and advance the mission of the charitable
corporation by adhering to its purposes, usually as set forth in the entity's
articles of incorporation or bylaws." 347 Although popular among theorists of
non-profit law, the application of the duty of obligation has appeared "in
only a handful of cases."
34s
In for-profit corporations, the concept of the duty of obligation is referred
to as the duty of obedience and prevents directors from conducting an ultra
342 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 228 (1992).
343 Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board
Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation's Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 8o CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
689, 720 (2005).
344 Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the
Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 73 (2005).
345 Id. at I.
346 Id. at 41-43.
347 Id. at 44.
348 Id. at 43-44-
2007- 2oo8 ]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
vires act.349 In the private corporate world, suits based on ultra vires act are
rarer than breaches of other fiduciary duties. An ultra vires suit must allege
that the corporation operated outside of its designated powers. Historically,
the charter or articles of incorporation of a corporation spelled out limited
powers for the entity so as to prevent directors from taking the corporation
into areas that the investors or the state granting the charter did not intend.
More modernly, corporation codes allow a corporation to operate in "any
lawful business "350 so as to give entities the flexibility to change business
plans as the market changes.
The enabling legislation for a privatized Trust Fund should state
a narrow purpose and the duty of obligation should be strengthened to
ensure accountability. Fiduciary duties are strengthened in non-profits
when "'mission primacy' [is] recognized as a central objective of the ...
enterprise" and the focus on mission creates a higher standard-a "duty
of obedience ... to advance [the entity's] public purpose." '' What is the
public purpose or mission of the Trust Fund? As previously stated, this
paper argues that the purpose, first and foremost, should be to maximize
the wealth of the Trust in order to achieve full funding.
Professor Froomkin suggests that "[tihe profit motive alone is probably
an insufficient constitutional justification for an [FGC] because the
applicable federal powers are only incidental to other Article I powers."3 '
Professor Froomkin notes that the U.S. has never created a corporation
"solely or primarily to produce revenue," although a proposal in the Clinton
administration to create a Technology Transfer and Commercialization
Financing Corporation would have been profit motivated.31 3 A privatized
Trust Fund, might at first blush, seem to be created solely for the purpose
of making a profit given that the duties of the directors and officers will be
to maximize the wealth of the Trust Fund. Seen solely through this lens, the
Trust Fund would not fit the notion that government should not participate
in free market competition in the private sector. However, the Trust Fund's
larger purpose of funding social insurance through the vehicle of an FGC
justifies the creation of the corporation apart from its profit motive.
The mandated goal of maximizing return has been effective in
limiting social investing. ERISA's fiduciary standard as interpreted by
the Department of Labor (DOL) "prohibits trustees from investing for
349 The duty of obedience is sometimes mentioned as an additional fiduciary duty held
by directors and officers of "for profit" corporations. Cox & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 10.01.
350 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2004). The Act also provides that corporations can
limit their purpose to specific acts in the articles of incorporation. Id.
351 Greaney & Boozang, supra note 344, at 83-84.
352 Froomkin, supra note I5, at 581 (suggesting that nationalization of a corporation is
an appropriate model for the FGC when the government intends to take over an unprofitable
business, such as the passenger railroads, in order to maintain service).
353 Id. at 581 & n.198.
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any object other than achieving the highest return at the proffered risk
level." '354 Commentators have maintained that ERISA's fiduciary standard
forbids social investing3"' consequently eliminating one of the dangers of
government-based investments.
The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act also provides guidance.
The objective of the CPPIB is to "invest its assets with a view to achieving
a maximum rate of return, without undue risk of loss, having regard to
the factors that may affect the funding of the Canada Pension Plan and
the ability of the Canada Pension Plan to meet its financial obligations on
any given business day."356 The Canadian objectives are rightly limited by
forbidding "undue risk of loss" and that concept, if not the actual language,
should be incorporated into an objective statement for the Trust Fund.
While such language may seem limiting, in actuality it is consistent with the
fiduciary duties discussed above. The Prudent Investor Rule as modified
by full diversification would address the "the undue risk of loss" language
contained in the statement of purpose since a fully diversified portfolio
achieves the greatest return with the least amount of risk.
Finally, given the public nature of the Trust Fund and its purpose
to further the national interest by funding Security, the question arises
whether the officers and directors owe a separate duty to the national
interest. Historically, a corporation owes a strict duty to its shareholders to
maximize profit.357 However, some modern state corporation codes provide
that directors and officers can consider other constituencies, such as the
corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, the economy of the state
and nation and other community and societal interests.3 8 The American
Bar Association declined to put such a statute into the Model Business
Corporation Act since it is "not an appropriate way to regulate corporate
relationships." '359 Delaware, the leading state for incorporation, also declines
to include "other constituencies" statutes.
In discussing the duties of presidentially appointed directors in a
mixed ownership FGC (i.e. a corporation in which both the government
and private investor have an ownership interest and in which there are
some government appointed directors and directors elected by the private
shareholders) Professor Froomkin argues that government directors "may
feel-and should feel-a duty to represent the public interest. ' ' 36 Professor
Froomkin hypothesizes the situation where "the corporation is considering
354 Romano, supra note 8, at 84 1 n. 146.
355 Id. at 8ii.
356 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 5(c) (1997).
357 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 17o N.W 668 (Mich. 1919).
358 See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (2007).
359 Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2270-71 (1990).
360 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 588.
2007- 2008]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
trade-offs between profit maximization and nonpecuniary social interests
such as environmental quality or compliance with current government
policy.
'361
There is a fine line to be drawn when it comes to the purpose of the
investment vehicle and determining what is the public interest. On the one
hand, financing Social Security and seeking maximum financial returns is
clearly in the public interest; yet there are many other valid public interests
such as environmentally sound business practices. However, allowing such
nonpecuniary social investments has led some public pension plans to be
swayed to invest in politically motivated, low-return investments which
aid lobbying groups.3 6 This is a principal fear of the Republican leadership
in opposing government investment. A better, and more politically viable,
approach will be to define the public interest as maximizing the financial
returns of the Trust Fund for the purpose of funding Social Security. To
the extent that the federal government wishes to regulate business, it
should do so through the legislative and political process and not through
investments.
In summary, the fiduciary duties are incorporated into the enabling
legislation should include, at minimum, the following ideas: (1) the
beneficiaries (i.e. both contributors and those receiving benefits) are owed
a set of fiduciary duties by the directors and managers which include: (a)
the duty of care, (b) the duty of loyalty, (c) the duty of good faith, and (d)
the duty of obligation; (2) one standard to judge breach of the fiduciary
duties being the Prudent Investor Rule from the Restatement(Third) of Trusts
modified so that "[i]n making and implementing investment decisions, the
trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust so as to eliminate
unique or diversifiable risk" 363 and (3) that the articulated purpose of the
Trust Fund be to achieve a maximum rate of return for the beneficiaries of
the Trust Fund.
D. Regulation of Corporate Powers and Strategies
The federal government, will, of course, have an important role in regulating
a privatized Trust Fund. Some administrative law scholars contend that in
thinking creatively about regulating privatized government services, we
need to drop our collective conceptualization of a hierarchical government
structure where there is one central authority in absolute control. 364
Instead, accountability includes a number of actors and norms, in which
the government plays a role.
361 Id. at 589.
362 See supra note 7 for a discussion of social investing; see also Templin, Full Funding,
supra note 14, at 434-39.
363 Weiss, supra note i i, at 1010.
364 Freeman, supra note 55, at 671-74.
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The starting point for government oversight is, of course, the enabling
legislation which will specify the powers and authority of the corporation.
Typically, an FGC will be granted a perpetual existence, the power "to sue
and be sued (and to settle cases without Justice Department authorization),
to make contracts, to hold property, and to borrow."3 6 Some powers which
are natural to most corporate entities, such as the power to issue stock in
the corporation, should be prohibited under the enabling legislation. In
the case of issuing stock, no other non-governmental owner is anticipated
under this proposal therefore, the issuing of securities, including debt,
should be prohibited without an express approval by Congress.
One likely issue, however, is the extent to which the corporate
entity should be subject to the same rules and regulation as government
agencies. Although the entity will be considered the state for constitutional
purposes,366 the privatized Trust Fund should be treated as a hybrid
public-private entity for purposes of regulation. In order to maximize
return on investment, some of the rules affecting government agencies
should probably not apply to the Trust Fund, while, at the same time, some
constraints should be put on the powers of the corporate entity in order to
prevent corporate malfeasance.
1. Statutorily Mandated Investment Restrictions.-It is inevitable that special
interests will seek to influence the investment choices of the Trust Fund
in order to promote certain social agendas. It has become popular to label
such an investment strategy as "social investing." Social investing bases
the investment decision on values rather than on expected return. Such a
strategy seeks investments that will promote particular social purposes or
limits investment in companies that are unethical or immoral. For example,
"legislation might prohibit investments in companies that use child labor
or commit egregious environmental violations."3 67 Other examples include
investing in geographical regions that are economically depressed.
368
Likewise, such a strategy would avoid investment in tobacco companies or
firms that have operations in countries with poor human rights records.
3 69
Research shows, however, that "social investing may adversely affect
fund performance."370 Moreover, if social investing results in lower returns,
such a strategy may be a breach of a fiduciary duty to maximize the wealth
365 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 553.
366 See supra notes 62-155 and accompanying text.
367 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 140.
368 State legislatures put pressure on public pension plans to invest in local companies
in order to promote regional employment. Romano, supra note 8, at 796. Such investments
might keep a struggling company alive for awhile, but often there are competitive issues which
make such a company unprofitable, thus leading to an eventual loss of the investment.
369 Angelis, supra note 9, at 290-92.
370 Romano, supra note 8, at 8z9.
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of a trust.371 Of course, there are times when pursuing a socially responsible
or political agenda results in better returns. For example, by investing in
more efficient pollution control systems a company might save money in
the long term by having fewer clean-up costs. Moreover, some investments
that were once thought to have a purely social agenda without much profit
potential, such as alternative energy companies and other environmentally
sound technology, are now considered among the better investment
opportunities.37
Many of these proposals appear sound. However, putting socially
responsible constraints on investment leads to lower returns and opens the
door to the political manipulation to determine what is considered "socially
responsible" or moral. When investment criteria is based on ethics, the
debate turns away from prudent economics to what constitutes ethical
corporate behavior. Social investing "would add an ad hoc moral component
with no clear boundaries."373 While we can all agree that corporations should
not violate child labor laws, the line becomes less clear when the morality
debate turns to less clear cut issues. Some corporations now offer benefits
to the domestic partners of gay employees. Should a conservative Congress
and President mandate that investing in such companies be forbidden by
the Trust Fund?374
Sometimes, the pressure from legislatures on public pension plans is
purely political. As political tensions rose between Iran and the United
States in 2007, several state legislatures passed measures that would
compel state pension plans to divest their holdings in foreign companies
that operate in Iran, a country which the U.S. State Department labels as
a supporter of terrorism. A coalition of state pension plans responded by
treating the matter not as a political issue but as one of corporate governance.
The coalition is urging such companies to consider whether the rewards of
operating in a country such as Iran outweigh the risks.
3 75
Whether the social policy being advanced is sound social or even foreign
policy, such influence over the Trust conflates the government role of
regulator with that of investor. If the government wishes to advance a certain
social policy, then Congress should pass a bill and the President should sign
the legislation in order to regulate all investment and not just the Trust
371 Id.at8I-iz.
372 Mark Veverka, Cleaning Up, BARRON'S, July 16, 2007, available at http://online.barrons.
com/article-print/SBi 184204284299641o9.html.
373 Angelis, supra note 9, at 292.
374 Mutual funds exist which "prohibit investing in companies involved in abortion
and/or pornography, non-married lifestyles, as well as companies involved in the production
of alcohol, tobacco or gambling." FUND OVERVIEW FOR THE TIMOTHY PLAN FAMILY OF FUNDS,
http://www.timothyplan.com/Funds/frame--OurFunds-overview.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
zoo6).
375 Craig Karmin, Pension Funds Weigh In on Iran, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2007, at A3.
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Fund. As already noted, the mission of the Trust Fund will be to maximize
stakeholder value while reducing risk. With that in mind, managers, so
long as they invest legally and seek a fully diversified portfolio, should be
empowered to engage in any investment which falls into those parameters.
That would mean that the Trust Fund could invest in anything-from the
latest high-risk technology stock to businesses in China and India which
compete with American firms to the local pizza parlor. Of course, the
investment must be made legally-i.e. if a private hedge fund or trust fund
could not invest in the company then the privatized Social Security Trust
Fund should likewise be unable to invest.
Even if social investing produces better returns, specific restraints
could cause irregular pricing in a stock. For example, if the Trust Fund
invests in a company before the company commits the violations, then it
would be required to sell its holdings off at a time when the stock price
might be depressed when the violations become public knowledge. The
sale of stock by the Trust Fund will, in turn, put downward pressure on the
stock price since other investors holding the securities would know that
the government was poised to begin selling. Day traders, who are in the
business of predicting what institutional investors will do in the sale and
purchase of a security, could put additional downward pressure by shorting
the stock; thereby causing the company to be valued at less than its true
worth and probably hurting the portfolios of smaller and less sophisticated
investors.
That said, the Trust Fund should have a policy regarding ethical
investing. Many businesses maintain codes of conduct which restrict
them from certain practices and subject them to audits by private non-
governmental agencies. 376 Even though the CPPIB's first stated objective
is to "maximize investment returns without undue risk," the policy also
includes the statement: "[lhong-term responsible corporate behavior
with respect to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors can
generally have a positive influence on long-term corporate financial
performance." '377 The CPPIB also requires that its employees, officers and
directors adhere to a code of conduct which prohibits any illegal investment
practices including but not limited to any conflicts of interest with personal
investments. Following the CCPIB's lead, as previously noted, will more
likely lead to solvency for the Trust Fund.
Another common suggestion to control governmental or quasi-
governmental investing is to pass regulations on putting caps on ownership
of a stock. Rather than absolutely banning the purchase of stock, these
376 Archon F ung, Making Social Markets: Dispersed Governance and Corporate Accountability,
in MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE 145, at 152 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds.,
2002).




regulations cap the percentage that the government could own of any
particular stock.378 The primary purpose behind such regulations is to
cut down on the ability of the government to pressure the company to
adopt certain policies through shareholder voting rights. Such a restriction,
however, could affect returns for the Trust Fund. For instance, if a company
is a good investment, then a large shareholder will want to purchase the
entire company and take it private. The famed value investor Warren
Buffet has routinely done this in his investment career.
If such a shareholder cannot invest at his discretion, then perhaps
he might be forced to make less than desirable investments. A cap on
percentage ownership, in effect, interferes with any express or implied
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value. On the other hand, if the
Trust Fund owns a company outright, then the Trust Fund's status as a
state actor would then be conferred onto the company and subject it to
constitutional constraints which then might hamper its ability to be
profitable.379 Subjecting a company to constitutional constraints could
expose it to additional costs and possibly reduce its competitiveness.380
Outright ownership of a company by a privatized Trust Fund is likely to
make conservative politicians uncomfortable since the FGC is only one
step removed from the political process. For political expediency, if for no
other reason, the privatized Trust Fund should probably be limited in the
amount of ownership interest it can take in any given investment.
Similar restrictions might specify that the fund hold a maximum
allocation in any given asset class-e.g. a maximum percentage would be
held in stocks, bonds and real estate. While on the face of the proposal,
this seems to be in line with the principles of diversification, too much
control might lead to lower returns. Despite modern portfolio theory
and the attempt to quantify risk in order to diversify it away, money
management can "involve as much art as science. ' 38' There are a number
of subjective decisions that have to be made when investing in an asset. At
different times, it might make more sense to be overweight in one class and
underweight in another.
In her analysis of legal regimes to cover private professional investors
for a private accounts system, Professor Weiss wisely suggests that no
specific legislation be drafted as to asset allocation in order to reduce risk.38 '
Instead, she asserts that personal liability for fund managers as well as a
broad fiduciary duty to eliminate unique risk should be the basis of such a
378 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 140.
379 See supra notes 123-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consequences
of being deemed a state actor.
380 See supra note 153.
381 YALE CORP. INV. COMM., SUpra note 319, at 4.
382 Weiss, supra note I i, at 1014.
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system.3"3 She prefers a less interventionist approach into the investment
decision by the government since she mistrusts the government's ability to
make sound or for that matter rapid asset class decisions in response to the
market.3" If wealth maximization is the goal of the fund, then investment
professionals need freedom to make choices without preset limits as to
asset classes so long as there is a well-diversified portfolio.
Another common method to prevent government interference would be
to statutorily prohibit the government from voting on corporate governance
matters. In fact, the Thrift Savings Fund for federal employees has just such
a provision. 35 However, this solution presents the same problem of too few
active investors in corporate governance as the passive investing option.
Preventing the Trust Fund from voting shares would sideline an important
institutional shareholder. Given the rise of the institutional investor as an
important check against management waste, it is critical that the Trust
Fund not be silent if it enters the market. To do so, would essentially mean
that the world's largest shareholder would sidestep any issues regarding
management waste. An important player in the check against management
control would be absent during a time when there is increasing need to
monitor the activities of private corporate managers.
Rather than making the Trust Fund subject to additional government
regulation, it would be consistent with the treatment of many FGCs to
exempt a privatized Trust Fund from some of the regulations governing
government agencies.3a6 Ironically, some FGCs are even exempt from
the very legislation meant to regulate government corporations-the
Government Corporation Control Act.387 Congress' attempt in 1945 to bring
order, consistency and accountability to FGCs is largely thought to be
inadequate 388 and there have been calls to reform and reassert the Act.
3 89
In order to accomplish the Trust Fund's mission to fund Social Security,
the investment managers' decisions should not be constrained by regulations
which do not apply to private hedge funds. Imposing regulations may
amount to social investing which inevitably lowers returns. In some cases,
such regulations on government agencies make sense. A recent example
involves the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), an FGC which
provides financing and insurance for economic development in countries
383 Id. at 1013.
384 Id. at 1014.
385 Id. at 999-1ooo.
386 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 553-54 ("In keeping with the long-held theory that FGCs
should be run on "business-like" principles, many FGCs are exempted from civil service rules
regarding pay, employee tenure, and other rules such as the Freedom of Information Act").
387 Id. at 554.
388 Id. at 605-o6.
389 Harold Seidman, United States Experience: the Need to Reassert the Government Corporation
ControlAct 1945, 18 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 295 (1998).
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where political and economic risk make the projects undesirable to private
sector finance. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, standing was
granted to an environmental group suing OPIC for violating the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by investing in foreign energy projects
that contributed to global warming.390 Since OPIC's enabling legislation
designates it as a federal agency, it should be subject to the NEPA.
Moreover, the mission of OPIC is not to make money, but to further the
economic development of third world nations. Encouraging environmental
responsibility in those countries is consistent with long-term responsible
nation-building goals.
However, the privatized Trust Fund would differ from OPIC in its goals.
The purpose to the Trust Fund's investment will be wealth maximization.
In all likelihood, given the current interest in eco-friendly businesses, this
may very well mean that the Trust Fund invests in "green" companies.
That said, the Trust Fund would have to compete with private hedge
funds, mutual funds and other private actors in terms of finding worthwhile
investments. To constrain the Trust Fund with regulations that do not apply
to private entities would make the Fund less competitive. The freedom
of the Trust Fund managers to make investment decisions should be
unfettered. They should, of course, be subject to the same laws and policies
as private investors. This should not be viewed as an anti-environment
policy any more than investing in overseas works against American labor
interests. Rather, the acknowledgement is that the Trust Fund's primary
mission is wealth creation.
2. Mandatory Reports and Minimum Returns.-Rather than unduly restrict
managers in their investment choices, the enabling legislation should
mandate full exposure on the often quoted principle by Justice Brandeis
that "[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman. 391 ' However, the mandate of full disclosure should be
timed so that the disclosure of the investment does not lead to instability
and speculation in the markets. Moreover, the reporting requirement
should not transform itself into a political tool to shape investment policy
by the Trust Fund.
The enabling legislation for the creation of the Trust Fund could specify
the requirements for record keeping, annual reports and audits. 392 The
390 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007). NEPA
requires federal government agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement before
proceeding with a project and to consider alternatives. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
391 Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How TiHE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
392 See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 10101 (2000) (providing an example of the reporting requirements
and record keeping for some types of FGCs).
[Vol. 96
THE PUBLIC TRUST IN PRIVATE HANDS
Government Corporation Control Act,3 93 to which many FGCs are subject,
requires that wholly owned government corporations submit annual
budgets, 394 management reports consisting of statements of its financial
position, operations and cash flows395 and have its financial statements
audited.396 It certainly makes sense that a privatized Trust Fund be subject
to at least this level scrutiny if not more.
However, as is the case of all paperwork, reports and reviews have a way
of becoming an outlet for political pressure. It would be easy to see how
Congress might pass a law requiring that the periodic review also include
impact statements, such as those suggested by a New York state task force
looking to control the investment decisions of the public pension plan.3 97
The impact statements would "require public reports analyzing the effect of
fund investment and voting decisions on a variety of factors, including local
employment and the ... economy."' 398 Such impact statements might have
potential consequences for future investment decisions by highlighting
the effects on special interest groups, which in turn could heighten political
pressure for social investing. Any periodic review in which management
is judged must be limited to rates of returns and financial metrics that are
generally accepted guidelines for the private fund industry. Any attempt to
measure social goals will result in politicizing the investment process.
Additionally, management should be required to give periodic reviews
of portfolio performance. 399 An Audit Committee could be mandated and
given specific responsibilities to audit investments and performance.' In
the case of underperformance, the fiduciary or trustee would be removed.
Some minimal level of performance might be mandated; however, the
period of time between evaluations should be enough to allow for a
return, otherwise, the managers may not take calculated long-term risks.40 1
Legislation should also provide for methods to remove managers or directors
for any "malfeasance or nonfeasance" in regard to the management of the
Trust Fund.
40 1
393 The Government Corporation Control Act was enacted in 1945 in order to "impose
a modicum of uniformity on and control over the financial autonomy of government
corporations." Hobbs, supra note 256, at 735.
394 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 9103, 91o4. The corporation submits an annual budget to the
President who then submits the budget to Congress for the necessary appropriations.
395 Id. § 91o6.
396 Id. § 9105.
397 Romano, supra note 8, at 815-16.
398 Id. at 816.
399 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 133.
400 See, e.g., Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, R.S.C., ch. 40, §§ 30, 34, 39
(1997).
401 Solomon & Berson, supra note 3, at 133.
402 Id. at 132.
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Some records should not be made available right away and the Trust
Fund should be exempt from some federal and state open records laws. 3
One risk of full and timely disclosure is that traders will take advantage of
price swings as the Trust Fund moves investments in and out of stocks.
It may lead to instability in the price of some stocks if traders speculate
on which way the Trust Fund is going to invest in or divest out of stocks.
Consequently, while investments should not be hidden, some thought
should go into when and how such investments are reported.
3. Oversight by Executive Branch Agencies and Congress.-Finally, the question
arises over which Executive branch agency should oversee a privatized
Trust Fund and what oversight role Congress should play.44 Moreover, to
what extent should executive agencies or Congress be able to exert control
over the board of directors (apart, of course, from the appointment process)
and force the Trust Fund to act or forbear from acting? As with agencies,
Congress should have a role in seeing that the entity does not depart from
its mission. A mandatory report gives Congress the "convenient excuse.
. . to hold hearings to monitor the FGC's performance; in turn, the threat
of hearings gives FGCs reason to believe they have to account for their
actions."4°s
But what role will the executive branch have? Typically, there is no
centralized executive branch supervision of government corporations as a
class.' The predecessor to the present Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) stopped oversight of government corporations in the 1960s, even
though the lack of collective oversight "runs counter to the intentions of the
sponsors of the [Government Corporation Control Act]." 47 The enabling
legislation could certainly designate an agency to which the Privatized
Trust would report. Likewise, the Trust's mere presence in the investment
arena will subject it to the regulation of certain agencies, unless it is made
exempt.
What government agencies will have a role in oversight of the privatized
Trust Fund? As previously mentioned, the Justice Department should
have a role in overseeing the entity in order to bring lawsuits for breaches
403 Georgia state law "exempts certain records of the Office of Treasury and Fiscal
Services-particularly records involving electronic fund transfers-from the Open Records Act
by stating that they are not public and are not subject to inspection by the general populace."
W. Kent Davis, State Debt, Investment, and Depositories: Prohibit Access to Certain Records of the
Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services by Exempting Them from the Open Records Act, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 306,306 (1997).
404 Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security
Privatization, 64 BRooK. L. REV. 1043 (1998).
405 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 626.
406 Ronald C. Moe & Kevin R. Kosar, Federal Government Corporations: An Overview,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 12 (Mar. 23, 2006).
407 Id. at 12-13.
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in fiduciary duty. But which government agency should oversee the fund?
Since the Trust Fund operates somewhat like a mutual fund, investing on
behalf of beneficiaries, perhaps the SEC should be the outside government
watchdog agency. Yet, the Trust Fund also shares attributes with pension
plans, which are governed by the IRS and the Department of Labor. 8
Bank and federal insurance regulators might also claim some regulatory
oversight. During the public debate over private accounts, when thousands
of financial intermediaries were contemplated to handle the millions of
private accounts, it was suggested that federal agency consolidation might




While the SEC, Department of Labor, IRS and, of course, the Social
Security Administration could certainly lay claim to some degree of
oversight, the sui generis nature of the Trust Fund suggests that some of
the regulations of those bodies would not apply. While some rules would
certainly need to be followed since the Trust Fund is investing in the
markets-i.e. there should be no exemption from trading rules, etc.-some
other rules may not be as applicable since the beneficiaries are stakeholders
rather than shareholders.
There is a risk of politicization by the executive if the Trust Fund is
overseen by the SEC. The executive branch might influence the SEC to
promulgate rules which force the Trust Fund to act in ways which benefit
a certain political party. For example, 31 U.S.C. § 9108 provides that a
government corporation "may buy or sell a direct obligation of the United
States Government .. .of more than $100,000 only when the Secretary
approves the purchase or sale."'41 As previously noted, the Trust Fund
needs flexibility to make financial decisions as to when and how it sells
certain assets. While it may be mandated that a certain portion of the Trust
Fund be invested in government bonds, there will no doubt be some
leeway in which the Trust Fund might operate and requiring approval by
the executive branch whenever a sale is contemplated could hinder the
operation of the fund and the attainment of its principle purpose-to garner
a high return from a highly diversified portfolio. If a privatized Trust Fund
is to work, a review of the applicable laws and regulations governing such
an entity need to be reviewed so as to specifically exclude those regulations
meant to govern the non-governmental corporations but which, for policies
reasons, would not be justified to apply to an FGC such as this one.
Instead of yielding oversight to the SEC, a better solution might be
to mandate that both the OMB (as an executive branch investigator) and
the Government Accountability Office (as the investigator on behalf of
Congress) take on the role of auditor to ensure that two independent bodies
408 Karmel, supra note 404, at 1071.
409 Id. at 1073.
410 31 U.S.C. § 91o8 (2000).
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look over the books and analyze both quarterly and annual reports. It may
also make sense to contract out with one of the big four accounting firms to
audit the books as well. Regardless of the governmental agency cast in the
role of overseer, (and it may be best to have several agencies-each in its
specialty-overseeing the Trust Fund) there is a tension in that what might
be considered an oversight role could easily turn into political investing.
The most obvious protection against the politicization of the investment
process would be a constitutional amendment, which is discussed in Section
E of this Part IV.
One of the most politically charged issues to face any overseeing agency
will be the compensation of the managers who run the fund. The people
best equipped to make investment decisions are generally those who could
make a handsome wage in the private sector working for mutual funds,
investment banks, venture capital firms or hedge funds. The salaries in the
private sector tend to be astronomical compared to the income of citizens
who survive on Social Security.
In 2006, the top twenty Wall Street equity and hedge fund managers
had an average compensation package of $658 million each, ranging
from $1.5 billion to $260 million at the low end.41' Even with nonprofit
funds such as the Harvard Fund, salaries for six of the top managers were
a combined $107.5 million for 2003 when the fund soared 21%.412 The
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board paid its President and CEO a total
of $2.3 million Canadian in fiscal 2007 while the CEO, COO and the top
three other highest paid executives totaled $7.8 million Canadian.4 3 The
CEO's salary went up 123% over fiscal 2006 because of bonuses related
to the high performance of the fund as well as the board's estimation of
his personal performance. 4 4 At best, it is ethically troublesome to have a
million dollar plus compensation package for the managers of a fund when
some beneficiaries are struggling at below the poverty level. It is possible
that bright, motivated and altruistic money managers will want to take on
411 Scott DeCarlo, Executive Pay: Big Paychecks, FORBES, May 3, 2007, http:/www.
forbes.com/2007/o5/o3/ceo-executive-compensation-lead-o7ceo-cx-sd-o5o3ceo
compensationintro.html. The large compensation packages for hedge funds are largely due to
the industry-wide practice of "two and twenty" where managers receive a 2% management
fee plus zo% of the returns each year.
412 Charles Stein, Harvard Pays 2 Top Money Managers $25m, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23,
2004, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2oo4/11/3/harvardpays.2-top_
money-managers-25m1. The salaries were so soundly criticized by alumni and the press that
the manager resigned even though his salary was less than what he would have earned in the
private sector. Charles Stein, Harvard Fund Earns 19.z% Return, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2005,
at B5, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2oo5/lo/o i/harvard-fundearns_
192_return/.
413 CANADA PENSION PLAN INv. BD., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 50 (2007), available at http://
www.cppib.ca/files/pdf/Annual-reports/ar-2007.pdf.
414 Id. at 5o-51.
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the challenge of investing the Trust Fund for the pure status that it confers.
Certainly some public servants choose government service over Wall Street.
The chairman of the Federal Reserve could make much more than his
government salary of $180,100 if he switched to the private sector.
415
Assuming that a team of altruistic fund managers cannot be found,
how much should top flight fund managers of the Trust Fund earn? As
a threshold issue, the enabling legislation for a privatized Trust Fund
would have to explicitly exclude Trust Fund employees from the civil
service compensation limits. 416 It is not the purpose of this article to get
to a single figure but to suggest some guidelines for compensation. Most
modern models in executive compensation strive to create a system that
pays for performance. In the context of the Trust Fund, management
would be incentivized through a bonus system if.they made substantial
gains in closing the deficit gap. Such incentives will likely attract the best
investment analysts. The danger presented by such bonuses may be that
the managers make highly risky investments without diversification for
the chance of making a large bonus. Thus, any system must try to achieve
a balance to encourage behavior that maximizes the wealth of the Trust
Fund by attracting while rewarding the most successful money managers.
In order to align the interests of the Fund and managers, bonuses
should be paid for long-term performance rather than short-term swings
in value. To do otherwise would put the Trust Fund at risk of market
manipulation since share prices can be pumped up to show a short increase
in value. Investments on which a bonus is paid must prove out over time.
An effective restraint might mean tying up the bonus until long after the
manager leaves the fund.
To avoid politicizing the decision, the determination of compensation
should not be controlled by Congress or the President. This will have an
eventual effect of turning away the bright and ambitious people who are
attracted to the game of money management. The determination should be
based on metrics contained in the enabling legislation with any subjective
decisions being yielded to the board of directors. The negotiation over
salary should be conducted as an arms length transaction. In recent years
the pay packages for executives favored them because "directors' incentives
to enhance shareholder value are not generally sufficient to outweigh the
various factors that induce boards to favor executives.1 417 What might be
legislated are similar controls in terms of compensation review as are being
discussed for private corporations-i.e. a set of compensation committee
415 Barbara Hagenbaugh, Greenspan Steps Up to Microphone Immediately, USA TODAY,
Feb. 14, 2oo6, at ozB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2oo6-oz-13-
greenspan-usatx.htm.
416 Froomkin, supra note 15, at 553-54 ("many FGCs are exempted from civil service
rules regarding pay").
417 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 189 (2oo4).
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procedures which require review of the corporation's goals in light of
executive compensation coupled with review by outside consultants and
attorneys along with public disclosure of the steps taken in the decision-
making process.
418
The salaries paid should be commensurate with Wall Street salaries but
with caps in order to prevent windfalls based on the pure size of the Trust
Fund. The hedge fund industry typically gives managers a 2% management
fee plus 20% of the returns in a given year. Under such a metric, a modest
increase of 4% on the $1.9 trillion Trust Fund would pay out an unjustified
$76 billion pay package. Even with a cap on the salaries, it runs counter
to the collectivist nature of Social Security to award million dollar plus
bonuses to managers while beneficiaries subsist at the poverty level. On
the other hand, if a team of brilliant and motivated managers were able
to reduce the funding shortfall in order to prevent benefits cuts, then a
$100 million bonus, although it sounds unconscionable, over the course of
ten years might pale in comparison to the potential tax hikes necessary to
maintain benefits.
41 9
Finally, the managers' personal wealth should track the investments
made by the Social Security Trust Fund. This is not necessarily a
compensation issue (though if the Trust Fund is successful then so is the
managers' portfolio), rather it acts as a constraint so that managers do not
take unnecessary risks in the hope of garnering a large bonus. As noted
above, when managers are required to keep a majority of their personal
wealth in a fund that shadows investments made by the Trust Fund, it





The strongest protection against government or political interference will
always be constitutional restraints on the government. A constitutional
amendment could prevent the government from interfering in the
investment decisions of a privatized Trust Fund. A constitutional
amendment may not make the Trust Fund impervious to political meddling,
418 Id. at 195.
419 Under the intermediate actuarial assumptions, the projected shortfall in funding
could be erased if current and future payroll taxes were raised from the current combined
employer and employee rate of 12.4% to 14.35%. THE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY
INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. i 10-13o, at 56 (2007), available at http://www.ssa.
gov/OACTTRJTRo7trO7.pdf. Applying an additional 1.95% FICA tax to a hypothetical $6
trillion worth of taxable wages would cost taxpayers and employers an additional $117 billion
in a single year, clearly dwarfing the highest paid hedge fund managers on Wall Street.
42o The managers of the Yale Trust are required to put a large portion of their personal
wealth in the same investments as the trust they manage. YALE CORP. INV. COMM., supra note
319, at 6.
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but it is the best protection available to ensure that Social Security money
is wisely invested for the benefit of American workers. Given the amount
of money in the Trust Fund and even modest projections of what those
funds could earn if invested, politicians will naturally want to tap into the
Trust Fund for pet projects. The only sure protection of the Trust Fund
will be through the courts, and the surest protection in the courts will be
through the Constitution.
To "constitutionalize the independence of fund boards" is one method
to keep politics out of the Trust Fund.4"' Two examples where state public
pension plans managed to give constitutional protection to autonomy
in investment decisions and shareholders voting are in California and
Oklahoma."' Moreover, the measure mandates that the "board's fiduciary
duty to its participants and beneficiaries has precedence over any other
duty."4 3  That fiduciary duty-to maximize the wealth of the fund
while maintaining a fully diversified portfolio-could be constitutionally
mandated. The California provisions also give protection to legislative
manipulation of the composition of the board by requiring a vote by the
electorate for any changes in the composition of an elected board.42 4
While amending the constitution of a state is no small task, amending
the U.S. Constitution requires an enormous amount of political willpower
and time. On the other hand, if the one thing that the American public
agrees on, it is to not cut benefits to Social Security. If an amendment
which protects the Trust Fund from the political process is, as is argued
here, a necessary step toward guaranteeing benefits, then it is likely to find
widespread support among the electorate.
Would a constitutional amendment actually work? While constitutional
protections are likely to prevent "flagrant forms of legislative interference
in fund affairs, such as redeployment of fund assets or changes in board
composition," more subtle manipulation in the form of influencing
"politically sensitive board members" in making social investment decisions
may occur despite the constitutional protection. 425 Even so, a well-devised
constitutional amendment which clearly gives independence to the Trust
Fund will help to ensure that the money in the trust has the best chance of
flowing to its intended beneficiaries rather than some political purpose.
421 Romano, supra note 8, at 843.
422 Id. at 843-44.
423 Id. at 843.





Social Security is facing an inevitable funding crisis; yet lawmakers lack
the political will to reform the Social Security Act.4 6 In the meantime, the
Trust Fund is invested in low yield government bonds when it could be
earning a higher rate of return if it were invested in a diversified portfolio
of stocks, bonds and other assets. Economists agree that over the long term
a diversified portfolio earns a higher return than a bond only portfolio and
it does so with less risk. Investing the Trust Fund in the private and public
markets remains the best hope for Social Security to address the funding
crisis without substantially raising taxes or cutting benefits.
At that time of this writing, the current Republican administration
fundamentally believes that the only way to leverage the stock market is
through personal accounts where the individual taxpayers make investment
choices. The fear of the Republicans is that if the government controls
the portfolio, there will be political interference in corporate governance;
thereby hampering business decisions. Moreover, the Republicans contend
that investment decisions will be subject to political pressure which results
in high-risk, low-return investments thereby benefiting special interest
groups with lobbying power. The Democratically controlled Congress,
however, refuses to even discuss reform proposals with the President if
personal accounts are on the agenda. Among the several complaints, the
Democrats believe that shifting social insurance into individual accounts
fundamentally changes the collectivist responsibility of social insurance
such that it exposes low-income earners to a higher risk of poverty.
One middle ground approach that addresses Republican fears of
government interference in private markets would be to create a private
FGC to act as the investment vehicle for the $1.9 trillion in the Social
Security Trust Fund. The United States has a long history of using such
corporate entities in order to achieve political insulation when managing
the country's financial needs and goals. The solution should be politically
feasible to the Republicans since it leverages the markets through an
arguably private entity, and the Democrats should accept it since it keeps
Social Security centralized as a collectivist response to poverty in old age.
FGCs give rise to a number of normative, constitutional and practical
issues. While much has been written by scholars questioning whether
the privatization trend of government service is normatively sound and
consistent with democratic principles, the application of an FGC to financial
management has deep roots in our country's history-dating back to the
establishment of the Bank of the United States in 1791. The constitutional
426 Kathryn L. Moore, Reforming Retirement Systems: Why the French Have Succeeded When
Americans Have Not, 22 Amiz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 25!, 289 (2005) (arguing that reform in the U.S.
has not been forthcoming in part because of a lack of an unwavering political commitment
to reform).
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questions of whether the state action doctrine applies-i.e. whether the
a privatized Trust Fund would be a private entity or a state actor-can
be easily addressed by merely conceding that this FGC is a state actor
and then building a structure that comports with the Appointments Clause
and other constitutional requirements. Such a structure need not lead to
political influence in the appointment process if certain requirements for
directors and managers are maintained.
Finally, corporate managers can be held accountable through a rigorous
series of controls including: (1) legislating a high standard of the fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty on officers and directors and making such
officers and directors personally liable for breaches of those duties, (2)
mandating judicial review of corporate action by conferring relator status
on organizations charged with being watchdogs of the fund, (3) allowing
congressional and agency oversight of certain functions and (4) restricting
corporate actions so that the sole purpose and requirement of the fund is to
invest Trust Fund assets in a broadly diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds
and other assets.
While issues surrounding corporate accountability continue to be an
important legal issue, FGCs have aided the United States in implementing
financial policy for over 200 years without serious fallout. Moreover, the
model of a government-owned corporation investing social insurance
tax proceeds is used in Canada with success. Not only is the Canadian
entity free from political influence, but it is also yielding a higher rate of
return than the previous investments in government bonds. Whatever
is done about the crisis in Social Security funding, it needs to be done
soon.4 27 If investment is to work, there needs to be enough time for those
investments to mature. While some commentators, without understanding
diversification, criticize the markets as too risky for Social Security funds,
the real risk is in doing nothing. The failure to act shifts an unworkable tax
burden onto future generations and will likely result in benefit cuts and a
return to the social problem of poverty among the elderly.
427 DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-o5- 3 97T,
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: EARLY ACTION WOULD BE PRUDENT (2005), available at http://www.
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